



**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**UNITED STATES SPACE COMMAND**  
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General Stephen N. Whiting, U.S. Space Force  
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*18 Mar 24*

The Honorable Mike Rogers  
Chairman  
Committee on Armed Services  
U.S. House of Representatives  
Washington D.C., 20515

Dear Mr. ~~Chairman~~, *Sir*,

I greatly appreciate your continued support of the Nation's armed forces and the opportunity to address my unfunded priorities, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 222a. Your support for United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) priorities in the Fiscal Year 2025 (FY25) National Defense Authorization Act and the Defense Appropriations Act is critical to enabling USSPACECOM and the broader Joint Force to integrate military spacepower, deter adversary aggression, and defend national interests.

Chinese and Russian threats in the space domain pose a dangerous challenge to the American military instrument of national power and our modern way of life. China's increasingly assertive actions have made the space domain more contested and have created threats to our critical space infrastructure and national spacepower. This, in turn, puts Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians at risk, who rely on space capabilities every day. Meanwhile, as the conflict in Ukraine continues, Russia presents an acute threat as it becomes increasingly focused on its cyber, nuclear, and space capabilities, all of which pose a significant risk to the Joint Force. Both states are already deploying counterspace capabilities that can target U.S. space systems, to include the deployment of counterspace capabilities that can target our Global Positioning System and other space assets, in an attempt to hinder U.S. military preparation and response in a conflict. The Department of Defense must keep pace with our adversary's dynamic advances in this domain. My unfunded priorities for FY25, outlined below, are necessary to provide USSPACECOM with the critical capabilities required to defend our nation's vital infrastructure and protect the Joint Force.

For your consideration, the following are my unfunded priorities for FY25:

1. **Scalable Space Superiority Capability** – see classified annex.
2. **Rapid Scalable Space Operations Platform** – see classified annex.
3. **Navy Counterspace Capability** – see classified annex.

4. **Navy Mobile Counterspace Capability** – see classified annex.
5. **Navy Space-Enabled Indications and Warnings Capability** – see classified annex.
6. **Lunar Locust** – see classified annex.
7. **Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program** – see classified annex.
8. **Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) Cell** – see unclassified annex for further details.
  - (a) **Funds Required:** \$26 Million (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) – 3620, PE 1203940SF)
  - (b) **Description of Requirement:** JCO augments tracking data for geostationary space threats, provides near-real time change detection, and enables Protect and Defend response option planning using commercial capabilities for USSPACECOM, other combatant commands, and Allies and partner nations. JCO currently integrates 14 Allies and partner nations into operations and has begun expansion to normalized 24/7 operations as well as Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) and Satellite Communications (SATCOM) Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) detection and geolocation.
  - (c) **Funding Would Procure the Following:**
    - (1) Electromagnetic spectrum Space Domain Awareness (SDA) operations support and artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) for automated trending
    - (2) Low Earth Orbit (LEO)-focused SDA for Protect and Defend and military space flight safety
  - (d) **Risk Reduction Assessment:** To be most effective, SDA must be integrated and interoperable with Allies and partners and underpinned with increasingly robust domain awareness capabilities. Full funding will sustain continuous operations with 14 Allies and partner nations, increase data sharing and collaboration with the Commercial Integration Cell, augment military SDA network's data volume and capacity, and reduce critical coverage gaps. Without funding, expansion capabilities will not be integrated, putting U.S., Allies, and partner nation Protect and Defend operations at risk.
9. **Consolidated Space Operations Facility (CSOF) Procurement** – see unclassified annex for further details.
  - (a) **Funds Required:** \$27.073 Million (Other Procurement – 3080F, SAG 15X, PE 1202140F)
  - (b) **Description of Requirement:** The CSOF will accommodate over 600 personnel who will monitor potential on-orbit threats and develop solutions for U.S. space assets if they come under attack. **(Note, this unfunded priority is only included here if not appropriated for FY24.)**
  - (c) **Funding Would Procure the Following:**

- (1) Procurement for the future home of the National Space Defense Center (NSDC)
  - (2) Provide furnishings, IT equipment, facility engineering requirements
  - (d) **Risk Reduction Assessment:** Funding will reduce the risks associated with delays in long-lead information technology requirements and the potential loss of the skilled workforce infrastructure necessary to keep CSOF operations starting on time in FY27. Without funding, occupancy of the facility will slip from FY26 to FY28, impacting NSDC's ability to command and control protect and defend forces.
10. **Enabling Capabilities for Project Lighthouse** – see unclassified annex for further details.
- (a) **Funds Required:** \$161.5 Million (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) – 3620, SAG N/A, PE 1203940SF / BPAC 67A017)
  - (b) **Description of Requirement:** Project Lighthouse integrates radars and other sensor capabilities essential to coordination of SDA. Obsolescent components inhibit integration of key enablers. Major sensor upgrades and high-quality software tools are required speed delivery of quality data to decision makers responsible for the protection and defense of Joint Forces.
  - (c) **Funding Would Procure the Following:**
    - (1) Completion of the new Multi-Mission Advanced Radar Capability radar on Ascension Island
    - (2) Tasking software upgrades—Fylingdales, Pituffuk, and Clear upgraded early warning radars
    - (3) Increased data flow rates—deployment of SDANet to Space Surveillance Network (SSN)
    - (4) Integrated Solutions for Situational Awareness tech refresh to prevent failure
  - (d) **Risk Reduction Assessment:** Full funding reduces risk of sensor latency, improves overall SDA sensor resiliency and increases the availability of decision-quality mission data to USSPACECOM. As Project Lighthouse has developed, inhibitors to sensor orchestration have been uncovered through studies and other analysis. These four efforts are needed to realize the benefit of worldwide sensor integration. Without funding, sensor data flows will lag needed timelines for tasking and orchestration.
11. **SDA Sensor Upgrades and Modernization** – see classified annex for further details.
- (a) **Funds Required:** \$179.25 Million (RDT&E – 3620, PE 0606002A, PE 1203940SF, PE 0604759A)
  - (b) **Description of Requirement.** Provides essential upgrades to the U.S. Army Reagan Test Site's Advanced Research Projects Agency Long-Range Tracking and Instrumentation Radar (ALTAIR) system and the Target Resolution and Discrimination Experiment (TRADEX) radar system, as well the addition of a Multi-static Radar Transmitter and Received Complex. Additionally, this provides for initial development of digital upgrades to Upgraded Early Warning

Radars (UEWR) and Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (PARCS).

(c) **Funding Would Procure the Following:**

- (1) Replacement of the ALTAIR very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF) transmitter system, power supply, and outdated solid-state electronics
- (2) Redesign of the TRADEX radio frequency feedhorn, addition of S-band angle measurements and waveguide hardware
- (3) Upgrades to existing radars to enable better operations across radio spectrum phenomenology
- (4) Mature digital ground-based radar design and build signal chain demonstration engineering unit to inform design and tactics, techniques, and procedures for upgrades to UEWR and PARCS radar systems to provide enhanced battlespace awareness

(d) **Risk Reduction Assessment:** Radar capabilities and infrastructure at the Reagan Test Site are the only multi-phenomenology deep space surveillance contributing systems operating in the Pacific. Loss of transmitters, power supply, or L/S band all weather deep space coverage will take years to recover from. Additionally, UEWR and PARCS radars provide 70% of the SDA observations and digitizing these systems will enhance tracking performance, resolve closely spaced objects, and obtain new and higher quality measurements while providing an expanded electronic protection suite to ensure successful missions against emerging threats. See classified annex for additional information.

**12. Radio Frequency Augmentation for Transregional Threats** – See classified annex.

Identical letters have been provided to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the other Defense Oversight Committees. Thank you for your consideration and continued support for USSPACECOM, our uniformed service members, civilians, and contractor personnel serving in defense of our Nation.



STEPHEN N. WHITING  
General, USSF  
Commander

Attachments:

1. USSPACECOM Unfunded Priority List Annex

cc:

The Honorable Adam Smith  
Ranking Member