

Managers' Political Ideology and Gender Inequality in Hiring and Promotion

Seth Carnahan
Ross School of Business
University of Michigan
scarnaha@umich.edu

Brad N Greenwood
Fox School of Business
Temple University
brad.n.greenwood@gmail.com

Abstract

Significant prior research has examined the role that managers play in producing gender inequality in organizations, but little work has directly explored the role of managers' beliefs and attitudes. We bring managers' beliefs and attitudes to the fore by theorizing about the relationship between managers' political ideology, situated on a liberal-conservative continuum, and the level of gender inequality among their subordinates. Using novel microdata from the legal services industry, we find that law offices whose partners are more liberal have lower rates of gender inequality in the hiring and promotion of associate attorneys. Further, examining the interaction between partners' gender and partners' political ideology, we find that the political ideology of male partners is significantly more powerful in affecting these differences as compared with the ideology of female partners. Finally, we do not find evidence that these differences are driven by selection, in the form of higher quality female associates choosing to work for more liberal partners. We discuss the implications of our theory and findings for individual careers and firm performance.

Introduction

The role that firms play in producing gender inequality is a crucial topic of study for organizational researchers. Given that managers make personnel decisions, scholars in this tradition have sought to understand why managers might vary in their use of subordinates' gender as a conscious or unconscious basis for selection and promotion decisions (Perry, Davis-Blake & Kulik, 1994). Within this vein, researchers have long called for work that examines managers' beliefs and attitudes, such as managers' reliance on gender stereotypes or managers' attitudes towards gender inequality. For example, Bielby and Baron (1986) emphasized that the most promising avenue for future work was "analyses of the role played by employers' beliefs and perceptions," in producing gender inequality, and Reskin (1993) noted that "[s]urprisingly little attention has been paid to the effect of employers' gender-role attitudes on their personnel decisions."

While subsequent work has begun to examine the connection between managers' characteristics and gender inequality among their subordinates (see Huffman, 2013 for a review), this work focuses almost solely on relatively coarse-grained comparisons between male and female managers, leaving direct theoretical and empirical examinations of managers' beliefs and attitudes elusive (Desai, Chugh & Brief, 2014; Gorman, 2005; Reskin & Padavic, 1988). We contend that theory which simultaneously incorporates managers' gender and managers' attitudes and beliefs paints a richer picture of the origins of gender inequality among subordinates. In developing such theory, we utilize managers' political ideology, defined as a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved" (Erikson and Tedin 2003: 64), to capture managers' beliefs and attitudes. We rely on a deep body of political psychology research that links an individual's political ideology to their beliefs and attitudes towards gender roles, gender stereotypes, and gender inequality (Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Jost, Federico & Napier, 2009). Following this work, we then situate managers' political ideology on a liberal-conservative continuum (Jost, 2006). Importantly, we focus on hiring and promotion because they are crucial processes that determine who enters an

organization and who obtains the status, compensation, and authority of managerial positions.

In the first part of our theoretical framework, we hypothesize that managers who possess a more liberal political ideology will have lower rates of gender inequality in hiring and promotion. In doing so, we link managers' liberalism to reductions in gender inequality through two paths. First, we suggest that liberal managers are more likely to possess non-traditional beliefs about gender roles and gender stereotypes (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009), making them less likely to believe that women lack the temperament needed to succeed in leadership roles (e.g. Ridgeway, 2001; Eagly & Karau, 2002) and less likely to believe that women will eventually leave the firm to pursue family responsibilities (e.g. Phelps, 1972). Second, we posit that liberal managers are more likely to believe that ameliorating gender inequality is an organizational imperative (e.g. Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 2013; Briscoe, Chin & Hambrick, 2014; Gupta, Briscoe & Hambrick, 2016). As a result, they may implement organizational policies and practices that make their organizations more attractive to female subordinates and more conducive female subordinates' success and promotion (e.g. Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006).

In the second part of our framework, motivated by the deep body of work that examines manager gender and subordinate inequality, we theorize about whether liberalism among male or female managers will have a stronger effect on gender inequality in hiring and promotion. We argue that male managers' liberalism will reduce an organization's level of gender inequality more than the liberalism of female managers. Not only might female managers have less power to assert their preferences (e.g. Ridgeway, 2013), but female managers likely have strong reasons, other than political ideology, to support female subordinates. Examples include in-group preferences (Reskin, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), homophily preferences (McPherson et al., 2001), and direct exposure to gender discrimination in their personal lives. Male managers, by contrast, lack these influences, thereby increasing the importance of ideology in determining their beliefs and attitudes towards gender inequality (Klein 1984; Reingold & Foust 1998).

We test these ideas in the context of large corporate law firms in the United States, a rich, socially important setting where gender inequality is of significant interest to both practitioners (e.g. American Bar Association, 2013) and researchers (e.g. Beckman & Phillips, 2005; Ely, 1994, 1995; Phillips, 2005; Gorman, 2005). Combining information from several sources, and casting partner attorneys as managers and associate attorneys as subordinates, we create a novel dataset capturing 1) political ideology using individual-level political donations; 2) law school graduates and the law offices that hire them; 3) associate-partner work relationships (both at the practice area and client-team level); and 4) the promotion of associates to partner. Importantly, these data also contain strong measures of associate quality, including law school prestige, law school honor society membership, Phi Beta Kappa, involvement in law reviews, and judicial clerkships.

Managers, Political Ideology, and Gender Differences within Organizations

Inspired by Bielby and Baron's (1980) call to "bring firms back in" to the study of inequality, a growing body of research suggests that managers have a significant influence on organizational gender inequality, such as in hiring, promotion, and compensation decisions. The interest in managers stems partly from the idea that managers "us[e] some type of mental discriminant function," (Bielby & Baron, 1986: 781) when evaluating job candidates and subordinates (Gorman, 2005; Perry et al., 1994), and that managers' beliefs and attitudes about gender roles, stereotypes, and inequality might influence this evaluation (Ridgeway & Correll, 2004).

However, work that focuses directly on managers' beliefs and attitudes remains elusive, with most work examining managers' gender. For example, both Castilla (2011) and Tsui & O'Reilley (1989) find that managers provide better performance ratings to employees who share their gender, and many studies find smaller gender differences in hiring, promotion, and compensation within organizations that have more female managers (e.g. Abraham, 2015; Bilimoria, 2006; Cohen, Haveman & Broschak, 1998; Ely, 1995; Elliott & Smith, 2004; Kulis, 1997; Cohen & Broschak, 2013; Cohen and Huffman, 2007; Gorman, 2005; Hultin and Szulkin, 1999; Jacobs, 1992; Kurtulus

and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012; Matsa & Miller, 2011; Shenhav and Haberfeld, 1992)¹. While these results may be driven by differences between female and male managers in terms of their beliefs and attitudes, such as their use of gender stereotypes and/or their concern about gender inequality in the workplace (Cohen & Huffman, 2007), it is difficult to separate these beliefs and attitudes from other powerful motivators, such as in-group versus out-group categorization processes (Reskin, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or homophily / similarity-attraction preferences (McPherson et al., 2001; Byrne, 1971). Indeed, Reskin, (2003: 4) emphasizes the difficulty of inferring managers' motives solely based on managers' gender, noting that “[e]xplanations that attribute motives to groups do not lend themselves to empirical verification because they ignore variation within the ascriptive group from which the allocators are drawn.”

We contend that political ideology provides a useful marker of a manager's beliefs and attitudes which, when combined with manager gender, may help provide a more complete theory of the role that the manager's “mental discriminant function” (Bielby & Baron, 1986: 781) plays in the production of gender inequality within organizations. While multiple dimensions of ideology are possible (Jost, 2006), we follow prior literature by defining managers' political ideology on a liberal-conservative continuum (e.g. Chin et al., 2013). Our focus on political ideology is motivated by a deep body of political science research (Adams 1997; Manza & Brooks 1999; Brooks & Bolzendahl 2004) that shows marked differences among individuals with liberal versus conservative ideologies (see Jost et al., 2003 for a review), with each ideology rooted in its own distinct set of moral foundations (Graham, Haidt & Nosek, 2009).

Liberals, for example, tend to take a more optimistic view of human nature and hold what Sowell (2007) calls an “unconstrained vision,” where perfectibility of society is theoretically possible. This point of view pushes liberals to favor social change, social justice, and equality in

¹ The “value-threat” approach, which describes why minority managers may resist providing assistance to members of their ascriptive group, has emerged as a counterpoint to this work (Duguid, 2012; Duguid, Lloyd & Tolbert, 2012; Srivastava & Sherman, 2014).

outcomes. Conservatives, by contrast, hold what Sowell (2007) calls a “constrained vision” that emphasizes the imperfectability of human nature and the likelihood that changes to the social order often have unforeseeable negative consequences that may exacerbate social problems. This viewpoint pushes conservatives to place importance on stability, respect for authority, and tradition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Tetlock, 2000). Most important for our purposes, this work also shows that liberals and conservatives have markedly different beliefs and attitudes about 1) gender roles in the family, 2) personality-related gender stereotypes, and 3) gender inequality as a social issue that organizations should solve.

With regard to gender roles in the family, conservatives often emphasize the value of a traditional division of household labor where men work outside the home and women work inside the home, e.g. raising children (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004; Davis & Greenstein, 2009; Mason and Lu, 1988; Klein, 1984). Surveys (such as the General Social Survey which is excerpted in Table 1) indicate that conservatives value a traditional division of household labor in part because they feel that children may suffer unexpected negative consequences if their mother works outside the home (Cotter et al., 2011). Liberals, on the other hand, are more likely to view a traditional division of household labor through the lens of inequality, insofar as they believe women working inside the home have less access to power and status (e.g. Jost et al., 2003).

Research further suggests that conservatives and liberals differ in the extent to which they believe gender may help signal an individual’s personality traits and suitability for leadership. Traditional personality-related gender stereotypes depict men as decisive, assertive, and/or impulsive; and women as friendly, cooperative, and/or weak (e.g. Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Political research suggests that individuals with a more conservative political ideology may be more likely to adhere to these stereotypes (Matland & King, 2002), perhaps because these stereotypes are traditional. This reliance on stereotypes may make conservatives less likely to view women as strong candidates for leadership positions or political office (King & Matland 2003; Lawless & Pearson,

2008; Sobonmatsu, 2002), perhaps because conservatives are more likely to prefer a more “agentic” leadership style (Winter, 2010), which is more often associated with men (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Liberals, on the other hand, are, on the margin, more likely to support female leaders, in part due to an inclination to prefer leaders who exhibit more “communal” characteristics (Winter, 2010), a quality more often associated with women (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). In Table 1, we see that liberals are less likely to believe that men are emotionally better suited for politics than women, which prior scholars have used to infer respondents’ attitudes towards gender differences in leadership characteristics (e.g. Rosenwasser & Dean, 1989).

Perhaps in part because inequality reduction is a key concern of liberalism, political ideology also correlates with individuals’ attitudes and beliefs about the role that organizations should play in influencing gender inequality (e.g. Kane & Whipkey, 2009). For example, liberals are more likely than conservatives to agree that “because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women,” (see Table 1) suggesting that liberals may feel justified using their managerial power and authority to pursue a social preference for less gender inequality. Conservatives, on the other hand, may view such pursuits as unfair, preferring instead to hire and promote based solely on perceived merit (Baunach 2002; Garcia et al. 2005; Hing et al., 2011).

Managers’ Political Ideology and Gender Inequality in Hiring

We next examine why and how these features of a manager’s political ideology might influence gender inequality in hiring, the critical point at which an individual gains access to an organization (e.g. Cohen, Broschak & Haveman, 1998; Cohen & Broschak, 2013; Gorman, 2005; Kanter, 1977). Researchers interested in why and how gender enters into personnel outcomes like hiring (and promotion, which we discuss next) often make a distinction between interactional and structural mechanisms (e.g. Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin, 1999), and we frame our argument by explaining why political ideology might influence each of these drivers of gender inequality. We follow Gorman (2005: 703) by defining interactional mechanisms as those that “occur when

organizational decision makers repeatedly form impressions and evaluations of employees or candidates in face-to-face or mediated social encounters, and then use those impressions and evaluations as bases for selection decisions,” and by defining structural mechanisms as “established, often formalized, [organizational] policies and practices—job descriptions, eligibility requirements, recruitment practices, and so on.”

When considering how political ideology might influence interactional mechanisms, it is important to emphasize that hiring decisions are often based on uncertain projections of a candidate’s future behavior. Candidate gender enters these projections via the “injunctive” or “prescriptive” nature of gender roles and stereotypes, meaning that a manager’s expectations about male and female candidates’ future behavior are reflected in the manager’s preferences about the way that men and women *should* behave (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Eagly, 2013). Because political ideology itself is prescriptive, defining how society “should” be organized, clear connections can be made between a manager’s political ideology and their evaluation of male versus female candidates. Consider, for example, the relationship between political ideology and attitudes about division of labor within the household. Because liberal managers are less likely than conservative managers to believe that households should be characterized by a traditional, gender-based division of labor, they may be less likely to believe that female job candidates will miss work or quit the organization to fulfill family responsibilities. This may increase liberal managers’ willingness, on the margin, to invest in female job candidates by hiring them.

In addition, interactional evaluations of job candidates may be affected by whether a manager feels that a candidate “fits” with the manager and with the organization’s culture (Chatman, 1991; Gorman, 2005). Liberal managers may, on the margin, be more likely than conservative managers to perceive a fit with female candidates. Political research suggests that conservatives tend to value stereotypically masculine traits (e.g. decisiveness, aggressiveness), while liberals tend to be more

positive about stereotypically feminine traits (e.g. friendliness, inclusiveness (Winter, 2010)). To the extent that managers' may use job candidates' gender as a proxy for job candidates' personality traits, these preferences may cause liberal managers to view female job candidates more positively than might conservative managers. In addition, recent work suggests that managers' political ideology helps to determine the culture of the organization (Hutton, Jiang & Kumar, 2015). If liberal managers are less likely than conservative managers to produce a culture that values "masculine" traits, liberal managers may be more likely to perceive a cultural fit between the organization and female job seekers. Moreover, female job candidates may prefer the organizational culture created by liberal managers, increasing the likelihood that female job seekers accept job offers from organizations where managers are more liberal (e.g. Cable & Judge, 1996).

Liberal managers may also be motivated to view female job candidates more positively than equally qualified male candidates because they may be more likely to see gender inequality as a social problem that organizations should solve (Kane & Whipkey, 2009). Consciously or unconsciously, liberal managers may view the hiring of female candidates as a micro-level reduction in inequality, helping to advance a group which, in our context of high status professional services firms, is typically underrepresented. Conservative managers, on the other hand, may view the prioritizing of one group over another based on concerns about ascriptive inequality to be unfair to other groups (Sowell, 2007).

This difference between liberal and conservative managers in terms of their view of gender inequality may also influence the structural mechanisms (i.e. organizational policies and processes) that they put in place in their firms (Chin et al., 2013). Such policies and processes might be specifically intended to reduce gender inequality in hiring, such as the use of gender-blind candidate screening techniques (e.g. Goldin & Rouse, 2000). They might also include other organizational processes, such as more generous family-leave policies (Kelly & Dobbin, 1999; Briscoe & Kellogg, 2011), that are targeted toward women already inside the organization, but that have the effect of

making the organization more attractive to well-qualified female job seekers. For example, Salesforce.com CEO Marc Benioff, well known for his support for liberal politicians, recently announced an organizational policy to review pay of all 16,000 employees, stating that “My job is to make sure that women are treated 100 percent equally at Salesforce in pay, opportunity and advancement . . . when I’m done, there will be no [gender pay] gap” (Peck, 2015).

H1: Organizations whose managers are more liberal will have lower rates of gender inequality in hiring.

Managers’ Political Ideology and Gender Inequality in Promotion

In addition to hiring processes, it is also likely that managers’ political ideology will affect gender inequality in subordinate promotion. The manner in which managers’ political ideology influences gender inequality in promotion is similar to, but theoretically distinct from, hiring; owing primarily to the longer-term nature of promotion outcomes. Scholars emphasize that an individual’s gender influences their odds of promotion not just in the moment that the promotion decision is made, but also in years prior when they develop the skills and social relationships required to be competitive for advancement. Political ideology may therefore affect gender inequality in promotion via interactional and structural mechanisms that exert influence in both of these time periods.

Before subordinates are eligible for promotion, managers allocate training and developmental resources to them in a manner that is similar to the allocation of job offers during the hiring process. As such, managers’ political ideology may influence the allocation of these resources to male versus female subordinates via interactional processes. As liberal managers may be less likely than conservative managers to believe that female subordinates will eventually leave the firm to raise children (e.g. Davis & Greenstein, 2009), and liberal managers may be more positively disposed to the “communal” leadership qualities that are stereotypically associated with women (Winter, 2010), they may be more likely than conservative managers to view the training and development of female subordinates as a worthwhile investment. Furthermore, liberal managers may allocate more

resources to equally qualified female subordinates than conservative managers due to liberal managers' interest in resolving gender inequality (e.g. Kane & Whipkey, 2009). As a consequence, female subordinates who work with liberal managers may develop more skills and social relationships which make them competitive for promotion.

Holding skills and social relationships constant, political ideology may also influence whether managers endorse male versus female subordinates for promotion in meetings and discussions, via these same evaluative, interactional mechanisms. Similar to the uncertainty surrounding a job candidate's future performance, it is often uncertain how a subordinate will perform when he or she is elevated into a new position, and managers may use subordinates' gender to predict future behavior (e.g. Perry et al., 1994). For example, to the extent that liberal managers are more likely than conservative managers to believe that female subordinates possess stronger leadership qualities (King & Matland 2003; Lawless & Pearson, 2008; Sobonmatsu, 2002), liberal managers may be more likely to endorse them for promotion. In addition, liberal managers in a male-dominated field may push for the promotion of female subordinates in order to feel that they are reducing gender inequality. Conservative managers, on the other hand, may be less likely to incorporate inequality considerations into their endorsements.

Managers' political ideology may also affect structural policies and processes that influence gender inequality in promotion (Chin et al., 2013). Some policies and processes may be most important in the time period where subordinates accumulate skills that make them more competitive for eventual advancement. For example, Biogen, a biotech firm whose CEO George Scangos is known for his support for liberal causes, employs a program called "Raising the Bar" which is intended identify and train female executives, with the goal of preparing them for promotion (Leung, 2015). Political ideology may also influence structural mechanisms that determine how the promotion process is executed. For example, liberal managers' concern for gender inequality may cause them to push for more gender balance on committees that make promotion decisions, where

female decision makers might be more supportive of female promotion candidates.

H2: Organizations whose managers are more liberal will have lower rates of gender inequality in promotion.

Differences in the Effect of Ideology across Male and Female Managers

Our final set of hypotheses examines how ideology interacts with the managerial characteristic most scrutinized by prior literature: managers' gender. Taking this step allows us to provide a more complete picture of how managers' attitudes and beliefs influence gender inequality in subordinate hiring and promotion. Prior work suggests that female managers often have lower rates of gender inequality among subordinates, not only in hiring (e.g. Gorman, 2005) and promotion (Cohen et al. 1998), but also other outcomes like wages (see Huffman, 2013) and performance ratings (Castilla, 2011). Scholars often argue that female managers have more motivation than male managers to reduce gender inequality among subordinates, perhaps due to the tendency of individuals to support members of their ascriptive group (Reskin, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), homophily / similarity-attraction preferences (McPherson et al., 2001; Byrne, 1961), or direct exposure to gender inequality in female managers' own lives (Plutzer, 1988).

Because of these powerful influences, female managers may be relatively uniform in support for female job candidates and female subordinates, regardless of their ideology. By contrast, because male managers lack these influences, political ideology may be a more important determinant of male managers' attitudes and beliefs regarding gender-related issues, female job candidates, and female subordinates. Political science research provides support for the idea that political ideology will have a stronger effect on the views of individuals who lack direct experience with a particular social issue, such as gender inequality. For example, Klein's (1984) foundational study of why men and women differ in their support for feminism found that "women's support [for feminism] comes from group consciousness while men's comes from a liberal ideology." In addition, Kravitz & Klineberg (2000) and Kinder & Sanders (1996) find that liberalism is more strongly associated with support for affirmative action programs among whites than among blacks.

Male and female managers may also differ in the power and discretion that they have to allow their ideological preferences to influence their personnel decisions. In the male-dominated professional services context we examine, male managers tend to outnumber female managers, thereby granting power to male managers by virtue of group size. Further, scholars have emphasized that men tend to have more status than women in many firms (e.g. Ridgeway, 2013), particularly in male-dominated professions (e.g. Ely, 1995). Because of their privileged position, men may be more comfortable pressing their ideological preferences when making hiring decisions, allocating training opportunities to subordinates, and making promotion recommendations. These differences in power and status are therefore likely to make the ideological preferences of male managers more important than those of female managers in influencing rates of gender inequality in hiring and promotion.

H3a: The political ideology of male managers will have a stronger relationship with gender inequality in hiring than the political ideology of female managers.

H3b: The political ideology of male managers will have a stronger relationship with gender inequality in promotion than the political ideology of female managers.

Setting: Hiring and Promotion of Associates in Large Law Firms

We test these hypotheses in the context of large American law firms, an ideal setting which has been used extensively in prior work regarding the role of gender in organizations (e.g. Beckman & Phillips, 2005; Gorman, 2005; Phillips, 2005; Ely, 1995). Furthermore, gender issues are highly salient to members of the legal services community (e.g. Williams and Richardson, 2010), elevating the practical relevance of our results.

A law office in our sample typically hires about five new associates each year (See Table 2). Entry-level hires join the firm either directly after graduating from law school or after clerking for a judge. Lateral hires join following experience in a rival firm or a government agency. The process for identifying entry-level candidates is routinized, with law offices sending representatives to conduct interviews at a selected set of law schools (Oyer & Schaefer, 2015). To identify potential lateral hires, offices may use the social networks of existing members, place formal calls for resumes,

or enlist the services of recruiting firms (Gorman, 2005). Offices also receive unsolicited applications. For both entry-level and lateral hires, the promising candidates are then invited to visit the office to interview with members of the firm and, typically, a hiring committee that will take the input of interviewers before making offers to favored candidates (Gorman, 2005).

Six to ten years following associates' graduation from law school, the firm decides whether to offer the associate admission to the partnership. If the associate is not offered partnership, he is often asked to leave the firm, though firms sometimes offer associates the option to move to an "off partnership track" position which provides less power and compensation but does not have the same pressures to generate client business (e.g. Sherer & Lee, 2002). The decision to offer admission to the partnership is often based on a mixture of relatively subjective criteria, including the associate's ability to attract and retain clients, her technical legal expertise, and her ability to manage other associates (e.g. Phillips, 2001; Shinnars, 2012). The partnership evaluation process differs from firm-to-firm, but usually entails an assessment by the partners who work most closely with the associate, followed by voting by members of the partnership. This vote might take place among all members of the firm's partnership, or it might be limited to members of a promotion committee or executive committee, depending on the firm's policies (e.g. Galantar & Palay, 1994).

Data

The primary data source for our analysis is the national legal directory maintained by Martindale Hubbell ("Martindale") from 1999-2012 (our analyses cover 2007-2012, for reasons discussed below). Utilized in organization theory (Phillips, 2002, 2005) and economics (Parkin & Baker, 2005), Martindale has been in print since 1868 with the purpose of providing a listing of lawyers so that clients and other members of the legal services community can locate talent. Providing an accurate and up to date listing in Martindale is a strong norm in the legal services industry, particularly for the large firms that are the basis of our analysis.

The basic unit in the data is the attorney-quarter, which we collapse to the year level because

early years of the data do not contain data in every quarter. For each entry, Martindale captures name, firm affiliation, street address location, miscellaneous personal information (e.g. birth year, law school name and year of graduation), and practice area (e.g. criminal or corporate law).

Martindale and the American Bar Association furnish attorneys with an International Standard Lawyer Number (ISLN) which allows us to track attorneys over time and across firms². In order to calculate variables from other sources (e.g. profits, client gender), our sample consists of attorneys working for the largest 200 law firms by revenue (the “Am Law 200”).

Variable Definitions

Dependent Variables

All dependent variables are calculated for year $t+1$, effectively lagging independent variables by one year and ensuring an appropriate time ordering in our analyses.

Gender inequality in associate hiring. To test H1 and H3a, we, at the office-year level, measure *% law students hired who are female*. This variable identifies associates who appear in the data for the first time within two years of completing law school. We also include analyses where we examine lateral hires, which are associates who join the office after appearing in a different firm in the previous year. We focus on law graduates for data reasons, e.g. we may under-measure lateral hires if associates join the firm after completing a spell in a non-listed organization. In robustness tests, we move to the individual level to examine matching between law graduates and law offices.

Promotion. To test H2 and H3b, we measure promotion at the individual-year level, using a dummy that indicates whether an *associate is promoted to partner* in the following year. We capture these events when an attorney’s title changes from associate to partner while remaining with the same firm. We verify these promotion events by linking Martindale data to the “New Partner Promotions” database maintained by American Lawyer. We use the “New Partner Promotions” information to identify promotions that occur in 2013, because our Martindale sample ends in 2012.

² A small number of attorneys are assigned to multiple firms or multiple offices (defined at the city level) within the same year. We assign attorneys to unique firms and unique offices in each year using the procedure outlined in Parkin and Baker (2005).

Independent Variables

Manager liberalism. Following Chin et al. (2013), Briscoe et al. (2014), Gupta et al. (2015), and Christensen et al. (2014), we measure political ideology using attorneys' political donation behavior. We calculate the liberalism of an office or practice area using *% of partners' donations to Democrats (\$)*. To test H3 and examine differences by manager gender, we compare *% of male partners' donations to Democrats (\$)* to *% of female partners' donations to Democrats (\$)*. With some differences among individual politicians, Democrats consistently occupy the liberal side of American politics while Republicans occupy the conservative side during our sample period. We include donations to candidates, party committees, and Political Action Committees (PACs).

For the hiring analyses, we measure this variable at the office-year level because newly hired associates often do not commit to a particular area of practice when joining a firm (e.g. Rider & Sterling, 2014). Offices are defined by the city that is listed in an attorney's Martindale entry. For the promotion analyses, our unit of analysis is the associate-year, and we calculate the political ideology of the associate's managers within her office. We identify managers as partner attorneys in the office who share at least one of the associate's practice areas (e.g. criminal or corporate law). These are the individuals who allocate training opportunities and provide what may be the most important evaluation of an associate's suitability for partnership. In robustness checks we also consider alternate measures of ideology, such as *Partners' average donations to Democrats (\$)* and *Partners' average donations to Republicans (\$)*.

An important consideration relates to the timing of political donations relative to the timing of the tests of our hypotheses. We follow Chin et al (2013) by measuring an attorney's political donations for ten years, 1996-2006. We then test our hypotheses during the period 2007-2012. This approach ensures that donations occur prior to the outcomes that we study. We describe our linkage between donation data and Martindale data in Appendix A.

Gender. Martindale does not contain explicit information about gender. To measure gender,

we follow prior literature and use attorney first name (e.g. Phillips, 2005; Gorman, 2005). We first match the attorneys' first names to the dominant gender indicated by US Social Security Data, and second, to the greater than 95,000 first names present in the Gender Checker Directory. Consistent with prior literature, we exclude unclassified or unisex names (e.g. Pat; <~4%) from the analyses.

Controls

See Appendix B for a variable listing. Analyses account for time trends with *year dummies*.

Individual controls. We control for associates' experience using *Years since JD*, *Tenure with firm*, and *Age*. We have numerous controls for associate quality. Martindale contains short biographies where attorneys can list their accomplishments. We include dummies that indicate whether associates report that they 1) earned membership in *Order of the Coif*, a prestigious law school honor society open to no more than 10% of graduates, 2) participated as an editor of a *Law review*, 3) participated in *Moot court*, a club where students practice faux litigation proceedings, 4) served as a *Law clerk* for a judge, or 5) earned *Phi Beta Kappa* as an undergraduate. We complement these self-reported measures of quality with *Law school ranking*. We control for social ties using *% of shared law school among office partners* and control for associate political ideology using *Donations to Democrats by associate (\$)* and *Donations to Republicans by associate (\$)*. Further, we control for the type of law practiced by the associate using 23 separate *Practice area dummies* (see Appendix C). Finally, in the associate's practice area, we include controls for size (*# partners in attorney's practice area*), gender (*% partners in practice area who are female*, *% associates in prac. area who are female*), and age (*average age of partners in the prac. area*).

Office controls. The hiring analysis takes place at the office-year level, and includes controls for office-specific size (*# of partners in office*), age (*average age of partners in the office*), gender composition (*% of partners in office who are female*), and partner quality (*% partners in office from top law schools*) and hiring needs (*# of new associate hires*). We include 23 variables which record the *% of office partners working in each practice area* listed in Appendix C. *Office fixed effects*

absorb stable differences across offices.

Firm level controls. Across the promotion and hiring analyses, we control for firm performance (*Profit per equity partner*) and client-driven (e.g. Beckman & Phillips, 2005) motivation to donate to liberal politicians and support gender equality (*% female leadership among client personnel*). A dummy indicates whether the *Firm acquires another firm*.

To account for geographic differences, we utilize *state fixed effects* in models where we do not use office fixed effects (note that office fixed effects absorb state fixed effects), which account for differences in local politics and local labor markets. We also perform robustness tests where we drop highly liberal and highly conservative locales.

Samples, estimations, and results

We describe the samples, estimation approaches, results, and robustness tests for hiring (H1 and H3a) and promotion (H2 and H3b) separately. We then conclude with a brief empirical extension, an analysis of partners' selection of associates to their client teams for M&A transactions, which addresses some of the empirical limitations of our hiring analysis and sheds light on potential mechanisms driving the promotion results.

Estimation and results for associate hiring (H1 and H3a)

Our primary analysis for hiring takes place at the office-year level. We begin with a sample of all AmLaw200 offices from 2007-2011 who employ at least one associate and have political donation information for at least one partner of each gender (Table 2, Column 1). Our sample is then limited to the years where these offices hire law students (Table 2, Column 2). Predictably, we see that hiring office-years tend to consist of larger, more profitable offices. We do not see other significant differences across hiring and non-hiring office-years. Descriptive statistics based on office ideology indicate that liberal offices hire 48% female law students, while conservative offices hire 44% female law students, providing initial support for H1. Liberal offices also tend to be larger and more profitable, and are less likely to be located in the Southern US. Offices are similar in terms of representation of female partners, reliance on female-led clients, and age of partners. The

correlations in Table 3 reveal similar patterns.

Our dependent variable is a percentage bounded by 0 and 1, so we estimate a tobit model, with standard errors clustered by offices to account for dependence across observations. Estimations using fractional logit and probit models provide similar results. Table 4 displays results. Model 1 contains no controls variables and indicates a statistically significant relationship between partner liberalism and representation of women among hired associates, as indicated by *% donations to Dem. by partners in office(\$)*, supporting H1. Model 2 adds control variables. While the R-squared increases significantly, the point estimate of partner liberalism does not greatly change, giving us confidence that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of particular controls. Model 3 provides dummy variables indicate whether an office is liberal or conservative, with the excluded group being centrist offices. We see that liberal offices are not statistically different from centrist offices, while conservative offices have hiring classes that are about 9% less female than centrist offices. This effect size is practically significant, given that the average hiring class is 47% female. Models 4 and 5 test H3a, comparing the liberalism of male partners to the liberalism of female partners. We see that the liberalism of female partners (*% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office(\$)*) in the office has a very small point estimate that is not statistically different from zero. Importantly, a Wald test indicates that the two coefficients are different from each other ($p < .05$), providing support for H3a.

Robustness tests for hiring: alternative measures, office fixed effects, lateral hires, and geography

Table 5 provides robustness tests to these results. In Model 1, we use a different measure of political ideology, using average donation rates to Democrats and Republicans. We see a pattern consistent with Table 3, where we see that liberal and centrist offices have relatively similar rates of female representation in hiring, while conservative offices have significantly lower rates.

It is plausible that partners who are ethnic minorities may be more likely to support Democrats and more likely to hire female associates. To test this possibility we use the attorney's name to estimate his ethnicity using Origins Info (<https://www.originsinfo.eu/>; Belenzon, Chatterji &

Daley 2014). These data assign an individual to one of several dozen ethnic categories using first and last name. In Model 2 of Table 5, we exclude partners flagged as likely to be American Black, African, Middle Eastern, Indian, East Asian, or Hispanic. Results are consistent.

While a fixed effects estimator is not available for the tobit model (Greene, 2004), we use an OLS estimator to compute a model with office fixed effects in Model 3, and results remain consistent. We include lateral hires in Model 4, with similar results. Finally, we ensure that our results are not driven by geographic effects by dropping the more conservative Southern offices (Model 5) and the more liberal NYC offices (Model 6) and from the analyses; results are unchanged.

Robustness tests for hiring: Examining selection and “supply side” mechanisms

While the prior analysis is consistent with previous approaches in the literature, it does not account very well for the supply side of labor markets. For example, despite the inclusion of state and office fixed effects, conservative offices may have access to fewer female job candidates. Or, conservative law offices may want to hire female associates, but female associates, particularly those with more job options, may opt not to join conservative law firms. While our theory allows for this possibility, it is useful to understand the extent to which agency by job applicants, rather than by offices, may be driving our results. To address these issues, we conduct a law student-law office matching analysis. The highly structured nature of the law student job market allows us to control for the number of women in the labor pools pursued by each law office and to examine whether female job candidates with stronger observable signals of quality are more likely to join liberal law offices.

To build the sample for this analysis, we first identify the law school graduates hired by the offices in the previous sample. We then build the set of counterfactual law students that the law offices *could have* hired by identifying classmates of hired individuals, who also accept jobs with other offices in the sample in the same year. This guarantees that counterfactual classmates sought (and were qualified for) a job with a large law firm at the same time as individual whom the law office actually hires. There are 10,112 law students for whom we can identify at least one

counterfactual classmate, and we have about 470,000 possible law student i – law office j pairs, about 2% of which were realized. Our dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether law office j hires law student i . By examining interactions between law student and law office characteristics in each of these ij pairs, we can identify law student and law office characteristics that tend to “co-occur” in the job matching process (such as the gender of the student and the liberalism of the office). This research design is used extensively to examine tie formation between firms (e.g. Hallen, 2008; Mindruta, Moeen, & Agarwal, 2016) and labor market matching (Pan, 2015).

We estimate these models using logit regression; penalized likelihood functions such as rare events logit (King & Zeng, 2001) or Firth logit (Allison, 2012) provide similar results, as do approaches which rely on choice-based sampling to limit the number of counterfactual ij pairs (Manski & Lerman, 1977). Table 6 displays results. Model 1 contains interactions between the gender of law student i and the list of law office j characteristics provided in Table 5, measured in the year prior to the student’s graduation. Results are similar if we use the graduation year or two years prior (important since path dependent internship decisions might be made at that time). We see a positive interaction between *Female student* and *% donations to Democrats by partners in office*, which suggests that these variables “co-occur” more often in realized pairs than unrealized pairs, supporting H1 while controlling for the availability of female candidates in the labor pool. Model 2 provides support for H3a, showing that the liberalism of male partners is statistically more important than the liberalism of female partners in driving matches with female students ($p=.08$). Models 3 and 4 include highly restrictive law office-law school cohort fixed effects. These estimators assume that law offices are “choosing” among law students who graduate from the same law school in the same year and show similar results.

We next examine three-way interactions between the liberalism of an office, the gender of a student, and the student’s signals of quality, including law school rank (Model 5), Order of the Coif (Model 6), editing a law review (Model 7), and a count of these measures plus clerkships and Phi

Beta Kappa (Model 8). A significant three-way interaction would suggest that liberal offices are particularly adept at attracting female candidates with strong observable signals of quality. To the extent that such candidates have many job options, significant results would suggest that the preferences of female job applicants might drive our previous findings. None of these interactions is significant at conventional levels. While not definitive, the lack of significance argues against associate preferences as the primary driver of our previous results. In Models 5-8, all lower order interactions are estimated, but coefficients are not reported in the interest of space.

Estimation and results for associate promotion (H2 and H3b)

In examining our hypotheses regarding promotion to partnership our level of analysis is the associate-year. This sample consists of all associates working for AmLaw 200 firms who are at least five years removed from law school, since promotion occurs very rarely among individuals with less experience (results are similar with a four or six year cutoff). Consistent with prior research examining mobility at the individual level (Campbell et al., 2012) we use a combination of linear probability (LPM) and conditional logit models with office fixed effects.

Table 7 presents the summary statistics for this sample, broken out by gender and the ideology of partners in the associate's practice area. Women comprise roughly 45% of the sample, which is consistent with gender diversity statistics for large law firms. We see that women and men have relatively similar signals of quality (school ranking, order of the coif, etc.), but the raw promotion rate of men is nearly twice that of women. Men are more likely to work in conservative practice areas and in more profitable firms. The geographic distribution of men and women is relatively similar. Correlations in Table 8 show similar patterns.

Table 9 presents regression results. Model 1 provides an LPM without control variables, and include only the interaction of *Female associate* with *% donations to Dem. by partners in practice area* (\$) and office fixed effects. We see that gender inequality in promotion decreases when partners in the practice area are more liberal, supporting H2. Model 2 adds controls, and while the R-

squared increases significantly, the point estimate of the interaction does not change much, giving confidence that results are not sensitive to inclusion of controls. Importantly, we also see predictable relationships with control variables and promotion. Associates with more tenure, more experience, higher ranked law degrees, order of the coif, law review editorial positions, and judicial clerkships are more likely to be promoted, suggesting that these variables are valuable markers of associate and law student quality. This elevates the non-findings in the law student matching analysis in Table 6.

Models 3-5 split the sample based on political ideology of partners in the associate's practice area and provide the best opportunity for evaluating effect size. We see that gender inequality in promotion is about 73% higher (-.022 versus -.038) in conservative versus liberal practice areas – a striking economic effect size, which we display graphically in Figure 1.

Model 6 compares liberalism of male partners to liberalism of female partners, and we see results consistent with H3b – liberalism of male partners is much more important than that of female partners in driving the results. A Wald test indicates that the slopes of these lines are different from each other at $p=.02$. See Figure 2 for a graphical representation.

Robustness tests for promotion: Alternative measures, geography, and turnover

Table 10 displays robustness tests. Similar to results for hiring, we re-measure liberalism using *Average donations to Democrats* and *Average Donations to Republicans*. Results (Model 1) remain consistent. In Model 2, we calculate the change in % *donations to Dem. by partners in practice area* (\$) from the year that the associate joined the firm to the current year, in order to address the concern that career-minded female associates may systematically select into more liberal practice areas, and we see similar results (more on this below). Model 3 uses a conditional logit instead of an LPM and shows similar results. Model 4 excludes minority partners, Model 5 drops Southern offices, Model 6 drops NYC offices; results are unchanged. Finally, Model 7 uses turnover as a dependent variable. Consistent with expectation, we see that female associates are more likely to leave their jobs and that gender inequality in turnover is lower when partners in the

practice area are more liberal. These data do not allow us to cleanly distinguish voluntary and involuntary turnover, but this result provides additional support for the idea that liberal practice areas may be more conducive to the attachment and advancement of female associates.

Robustness tests for promotion: Examining “supply side” mechanisms with measures of associate quality

Similar to the results for hiring, it is important to assess the extent to which “supply-side,” associate-driven, factors might be responsible for our results. For example, it is possible that more career-oriented female associates (i.e. those who have the most motivation to reach partnership) systematically select into practice areas with more liberal partners. To address the idea further, we re-run our promotion analyses with three-way interactions between associate gender, partner liberalism, and observable markers of associate quality. Across the same five measures of associate quality used in the law student matching analysis, we see no significant three-way interactions (Table 11). Taken together with the law student matching analysis and Table 10, Model 2 (which uses the “change in partner liberalism” measure), the complete picture of results suggests against selection behavior by the most career-oriented / highest quality female associates as the primary driver of our findings.

Robustness test for H3: effect of ideology across partner gender

Women comprise roughly 18% of the partnership ranks in the prior analyses. Therefore, it is plausible that our results for H3a-b (which argue that the ideology of male managers will be more important than female managers in driving gender inequality) may be driven by relative group size, despite controlling for female partners’ density in our regressions. While our theory allows for differences in power to drive the results, it is useful to examine the effect of ideology in a setting—the selection of associates for client teams—where partners have much more individual control over subordinate gender inequality. Selection for a client team is an important intermediate outcome on an associate’s path to partnership, as it provides an opportunity to develop skills and client relationships (e.g. Briscoe & Kellogg, 2011).

To obtain client team formation data, we use Mergermarket, a private firm that tracks

worldwide M&A deals and records the attorneys who serve on transactions (Chatain & Meyer-Doyle, 2015). We link attorneys to the Martindale data and DIME data using firm and person names. Our analysis covers 4,316 deals completed from 2007-2012 with a median value of \$437M and contains 2,146 unique partners (each of whom make at least one political donation) and 7,695 unique associates. Each team in the sample has an average of 1.2 partners and 2.5 associates. In the interest of space, additional information about this sample and deals are available from the authors. This setting, a type of “internal hiring”, also provides a robustness test to our hiring analysis, as it allows us to clearly identify the set of subordinates that a partner might choose for his team³.

We identify a partner’s choice set of associates as those who share a partner’s office location and practice area and have served on an M&A deal (with any partner) at some point in the last year. Each observation is at the partner-deal-associate level, which allows us to examine the impact of partners’ *individual* ideologies on their associate selection behavior. Our analyses consist of LPM and conditional logit models, each with a highly restrictive partner-deal fixed effect.

Table 12 presents results. Model 1 shows that that female associates are less likely to be selected for client teams, but that this gender inequality disappears when partners make 100% of their political donations to Democrats. Model 2 indicates that the estimate is stable after controls are added. Model 3 examines a three-way interaction between associate gender, partner gender, and partner ideology. We see that the interaction is negative ($p=.09$), suggesting that the effect of partner ideology is once again weaker for female partners, supporting H3a. Model 4 replicates this result with a conditional logit model. Models 5 and 6 split the sample according to partner gender. We see that liberalism among male partners reduces gender inequality in associate selection, while the effect is not statistically significant for female partners. Replicating results in this setting, where partners

³ Interviews with M&A advisors indicate that firms differ in the manner with which they allocate associates to teams. Some firms allow HR to perform this allocation, with input from partners and associates, while others use a more informal system. Firms also differ in the extent to which associates have input in the allocation. Our modeling strategy is predicated on the assumption that partner’s preferences have at least some influence in the allocation process, which seems reasonable given partners’ rank and authority.

have much more individual control over outcomes, increases our confidence that group size effects are not entirely responsible for the effects that we observe in the hiring and promotion analyses.

Discussion

In this work, we develop theory that explains why and how managers' political ideology may influence gender inequality in their hiring and promotion of subordinates. We argue that managers' liberalism will be associated with a decrease in gender inequality in subordinate hiring and promotion, and we further suggest that male managers' liberalism will have a stronger effect on these outcomes than female managers' liberalism. In a unique dataset of attorneys working for large American law firms, we find statistically and practically significant support for our arguments. We find that gender inequality in law student hiring is 19% higher in conservative versus liberal law offices, and that gender inequality in associates' promotion to partner is about 74% larger in conservative practice areas as compared to liberal practice areas. We also find that these effects are driven primarily by the ideology of male partners, rather than female partners. Importantly, additional analyses suggest that these effects are not driven by female associates with stronger observable signals of quality selecting into work relationships with more liberal partners or by the fact that male managers tend to outnumber female managers in most law offices.

Gender inequality literature: contributions and future work

This study makes important contributions to research examining the role that organizations and managers play in the production of gender inequality. We respond to long-standing calls to examine managers' beliefs and attitudes (e.g. Bielby & Baron, 1986; Reskin, 1993) by developing and testing theory that links managers' political ideology to gender inequality in the hiring and promotion of subordinates. Examining political ideology significantly expands the current locus of theory that links managerial characteristics to gender inequality among subordinates, as most models rely on comparisons across male and female managers. Our theory describes several interactional and structural pathways by which ideology might influence gender inequality, including manager's evaluation of female subordinates' leadership ability and managers' implementation of

organizational policies intended to help women succeed. Which organizational policies and mechanisms connect managers' political ideologies to gender inequality? In addition to manager gender, what macro and micro-level contingencies attenuate or exacerbate the influence of managers' ideology on gender inequality? Does the ideology of resource providers, such as clients (e.g. Beckman and Phillips, 2005), affect an organization's level of gender inequality? These are all rich paths for future work that are highlighted by our theory and results.

Next, by demonstrating that political ideology drives substantial variation in male managers' influence on gender inequality, we shed light on a critical puzzle in the inequality literature. While prior work shows that female managers often reduce gender inequality among their subordinates, "it remains unclear how women initially attain managerial positions," (Cohen et al., 1998: 723) which limits the ability of a manager-focused theory to explain gender inequality. Our theory and results suggest that liberal male managers may be crucial reasons for women's initial promotion into a firm's managerial ranks. Future work with a longer panel of data could explore this idea more directly, examining, for example, whether the political ideology of male managers has a stronger or weaker influence on gender inequality at different points in a firm's lifecycle.

A third contribution of our study lies in furthering our understanding of *why* female managers are more likely to support female subordinates. Women tend to be more liberal than men, so the lower rates of subordinate gender inequality observed under female managers in prior work might be driven by differences in manager ideology, rather than manager gender *per se* (see Cohen & Huffman, 2007). We draw on work from political psychology to argue that social identity and homophily motivations (along with direct exposure to gender discrimination in female managers' own lives) likely "crowd out" ideology in determining female managers' support for female subordinates (e.g. Klein, 1984). Not only do we find empirical support for this idea, we also provide the first evidence in the literature that, even when controlling for ideology, female managers are more likely to support female subordinates (for example, see Table 12, Models 3-6). Our approach

underscores the value of exploring variation *within* male and female managers and highlights the need for future work that digs deeper, perhaps by directly surveying male and female managers (e.g. Ashford, Rothbard, Piderit & Dutton, 1998) about their attitudes and beliefs regarding gender inequality and linking those beliefs to subordinates' job outcomes.

Our final contribution stems from our direct examination of subordinate-driven, supply-side explanations for our findings (e.g. selection into work relationships with liberal partners by higher quality female subordinates). While agency by subordinates is certainly important, we do not find evidence that it drives our results. This is an important empirical contribution, as it provides *prima facie* validity to demand-side explanations of why managerial characteristics correlate with subordinate inequality. Prior literature in this tradition has built demand-side, manager-driven, theories while acknowledging (but not often investigating) the importance of supply-side, subordinate-driven, explanations. Future work that moves further and obtains data on job offers (e.g. Fernandez-Mateo & King, 2011) or identifies natural experiments where subordinates are randomly assigned to managers will make an important contribution.

Organizational ideology literature: contributions and future work

Our work also makes important contributions to research examining managers' political ideology. Prior work in this stream has developed unique theory that connects managers' political ideology to important outcomes such as corporate risk taking, targeting by activists, investments in CSR, and allocation of resources across business units. Strikingly, however, the vast majority of this work focuses on top five executives or corporate board members (see Gupta, Briscoe & Hambrick, 2016 for an exception) and explains firm-level outcomes. By developing and testing theory that links managers' political ideology to their evaluation of female job candidates and subordinates, we show the power of managers' political ideology to explain more micro-level, interpersonal organizational processes. This contribution helps build a foundation for a larger stream of micro-level research that explores how political ideology affects phenomena ranging from manager-subordinate relationships,

friendships at work, job satisfaction, turnover, and other outcomes. There is also an exciting opportunity to investigate the role that organizational life plays in shaping individuals' ideology.

Moreover, we theorize and find that manager gender overwhelms manager ideology in determining managers' effects on subordinate inequality. This logic and result contributes by showing that individual characteristics place important boundary conditions on the influence of ideology in determining managers' attitudes and beliefs. In particular, it suggests that loyalty to a manager's ascriptive group may crowd out loyalty to a manager's ideological group, particularly when it comes to supporting other members of that ascriptive group who may be subject to prejudicial behavior. Future work can examine how managers' ideology interacts with other types of group membership, varying from religious groups to different functional areas or business units within the organization (Gupta et al., 2015). Future work can also examine how ideology interacts with managers' personal experiences, such as exposure to a recession economy (Tilcsik, 2014), to influence their organizational decision-making.

Another valuable opportunity for future work is to examine whether ideologically-driven personnel decisions affect firm performance. Theory and evidence suggest that organizations often "pay" for their ascriptive preferences (e.g. Becker, 1957/2010; Siegel, Pyun, & Cheon, 2014). Future work could examine whether conservative and liberal managers accept lower performance in exchange for higher and lower rates of gender inequality among subordinates.

Limitations

We must highlight limitations and alternate explanations for our findings. The first is political homophily. To the degree that women are more likely to be liberal, a plausible explanation for our results is that partners are rewarding associates who share their political views. To reduce this concern we control for political ideology of associates in our estimations. However, this is still a concern because associates, being younger and less wealthy, have lower rates of political donations. The second is a preference of female associates to work with more liberal partners. While we

extensively address this explanation, and do not find evidence of its operation, we must emphasize that associates and partners are not matched randomly, and the ability of liberal partners to attract the highest quality female associates may affect our promotion results. Moreover, we lack data on job offers, which would be the most persuasive way to address associate preferences in our hiring analyses (Fernandez-Mateo & King, 2011). The third explanation involves resource dependence. If an attorney has more female clients, they may have been incentivized to both support liberal causes and to value greater gender diversity (see Beckman & Phillips, 2005). We are able to account for this possibility in a relatively rich way, controlling for the female leadership of the firm's clients. Perfect data would allow us to control for female client personnel at the partner level in our models, but these data are not available, and we must alert readers to this limitation of our work. Finally, we are unable to address differences between fiscal and social liberals. It might seem straightforward that our results are driven by socially liberal individuals. However, Silicon Valley, which tends to be characterized by executives with socially liberal and fiscally conservative ideologies, has well-publicized issues with gender inequality. Thus, unpacking the differences between social and fiscal political ideologies is one of many opportunities for future work.

References

- Abraham, M. L. B. 2015. Pay Formalization Revisited: Considering the Effects of Manager Gender and Discretion on Closing the Wage Gap. *Academy of Management Journal*, Forthcoming.
- Allison, P. 2012. *Logistic Regression for Rare Events*. <http://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-for-rare-events>.
- American Bar Association. 2013. *Closing the Gap: A Road Map for Achieving Gender Pay Equity in Law Firm Partner Compensation*.
- Ashford, S. J., Rothbard, N. P., Piderit, S. K., & Dutton, J. E. 1998. Out on a Limb: The Role of Context and Impression Management in Selling Gender-Equity Issues. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 43(1): 23–57.
- Baunach, D. M. 2002. Trends in occupational sex segregation and inequality, 1950 to 1990. *Social Science Research*, 31(1): 77–98.
- Becker, G. S. 2010. *The economics of discrimination*. University of Chicago press.
- Beckman, C. M., & Damon J. Phillips. 2005. Interorganizational Determinants of Promotion: Client Leadership and the Attainment of Women Attorneys. *American Sociological Review*, 70(4): 678–701.
- Belenzon, S., Chatterji, A. K., & Daley, B. 2014. *Eponymous Entrepreneurs*. Working paper.
- Bielby, W. T., & Baron, J. N. 1986. Men and women at work: Sex segregation and statistical discrimination. *American Journal of Sociology*, 759–799.
- Bilimoria, D. 2006. The Relationship Between Women Corporate Directors and Women Corporate Officers. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, 18(1).
- Bolzendahl, C. I., & Myers, D. J. 2004. Feminist attitudes and support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and men, 1974–1998. *Social Forces*, 83(2): 759–789.
- Bonica, A. 2014. Mapping the Ideological Marketplace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(2): 367–386.
- Bonica, A., Chilton, A., & Sen, M. 2015. *The Political Ideologies of American Lawyers*. Working paper.
- Briscoe, F., Chin, M. K., & Hambrick, D. C. 2014. CEO ideology as an element of the corporate opportunity structure for social activists. *Academy of Management Journal*, 57(6): 1786–1809.
- Briscoe, F., & Kellogg, K. C. 2011. The Initial Assignment Effect Local Employer Practices and Positive Career Outcomes for Work-Family Program Users. *American Sociological Review*, 76(2): 291–319.
- Brooks, C., & Bolzendahl, C. 2004. The transformation of US gender role attitudes: cohort replacement, social-structural change, and ideological learning. *Social Science Research*, 33(1): 106–133.
- Byrne, D. 1961. Interpersonal attraction and attitude similarity. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 62(3): 713–715.
- Cable, D. M., & Judge, T. A. 1996. Person–organization fit, job choice decisions, and organizational entry. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 67(3): 294–311.
- Castilla, E. J. 2011. Bringing Managers Back In Managerial Influences on Workplace Inequality. *American Sociological Review*, 76(5): 667–694.
- Chatain, O., & Meyer-Doyle, P. 2015. Alleviating managerial dilemmas in human-capital-intensive firms through incentives: Evidence from m&a legal advisors. *Strategic Management Journal*.
- Chatman, J. A. 1991. Matching People and Organizations: Selection and Socialization in Public Accounting Firms. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 36(3): 459–484.
- Chin, M. K., Hambrick, D. C., & Treviño, L. K. 2013. Political Ideologies of CEOs The Influence of Executives' Values on Corporate Social Responsibility. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 58(2): 197–232.
- Christensen, D. M., Dhaliwal, D. S., Boivie, S., & Graffin, S. D. 2014. Top management conservatism and corporate risk strategies: Evidence from managers' personal political orientation and corporate tax avoidance. *Strategic Management Journal*.

- Cialdini, R. B., & Trost, M. R. 1998. Social influence: Social norms, conformity and compliance. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology, Vols. 1 and 2 (4th ed.)*: 151–192. New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill.
- Cohen, L. E., Broschak, J. P., & Haveman, H. A. 1998. And then there were more? The effect of organizational sex composition on the hiring and promotion of managers. *American Sociological Review*, 711–727.
- Cohen, P. N., & Huffman, M. L. 2007. Working for the Woman? Female Managers and the Gender Wage Gap. *American Sociological Review*, 72(5): 681–704.
- Cotter, D., Hermsen, & Vanneman, R. 2011. The End of the Gender Revolution? Gender Role Attitudes from 1977 to 2008. *American Journal of Sociology*, 117(1): 259–289.
- Dahl, M. S., Dezső, C. L., & Ross, D. G. 2012. Fatherhood and Managerial Style How a Male CEO's Children Affect the Wages of His Employees. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 57(4): 669–693.
- Davis, S. N., & Greenstein, T. N. 2009. Gender ideology: Components, predictors, and consequences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35: 87–105.
- Desai, S. D., Chugh, D., & Brief, A. P. 2014. The Implications of Marriage Structure for Men's Workplace Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behaviors toward Women. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 59(2): 330–365.
- Duguid, M. 2011. Female tokens in high-prestige work groups: Catalysts or inhibitors of group diversification? *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 116(1): 104–115.
- Duguid, M. M., Loyd, D. L., & Tolbert, P. S. 2012. The impact of categorical status, numeric representation, and work group prestige on preference for demographically similar others: A value threat approach. *Organization Science*, 23(2): 386–401.
- Eagly, A. H. 2013. *Sex differences in social behavior: A social-role interpretation*. Psychology Press.
- Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. 1990. Gender and leadership style: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108(2): 233.
- Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. 2002. Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. *Psychological Review*, 109(3): 573.
- Elliott, J. R., & Smith, R. A. 2004. Race, gender, and workplace power. *American Sociological Review*, 69(3): 365–386.
- Ely, R. J. 1994. The effects of organizational demographics and social identity on relationships among professional women. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 203–238.
- Ely, R. J. 1995. The Power In Demography: Women's Social Constructions Of Gender Identity At Work. *Academy of Management Journal*, 38(3): 589–634.
- Ely, R. J. 2004. A field study of group diversity, participation in diversity education programs, and performance. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 25(6): 755–780.
- Erikson, R. S., & Tedin, K. L. 2000. *American Public Opinion: Its Origin, Contents, and Impact*. Longman Publishing Group.
- Fernandez-Mateo, I., & King, Z. 2011. Anticipatory sorting and gender segregation in temporary employment. *Management Science*, 57(6): 989–1008.
- Garcia, D. M., Desmarais, S., Branscombe, N. R., & Gee, S. S. 2005. Opposition to redistributive employment policies for women: The role of policy experience and group interest. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 44(4): 583–602.
- Goldin, C., & Rouse, C. 2000. Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians. *The American Economic Review*, 90(4): 715–741.
- Gorman, E. H. 2005. Gender stereotypes, same-gender preferences, and organizational variation in the hiring of women: Evidence from law firms. *American Sociological Review*, 70(4): 702–728.
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. 2009. Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5): 1029.

- Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. 2015. Organizational Ideology and Corporate Strategy: A New Vantage on “Socialistic” Resource Allocation. *Working Paper, University of Washington*.
- Gupta, A., Briscoe, F., & Hambrick, D. C. 2016. Red, Blue, and Purple Firms: Organizational Political Ideology and Corporate Social Responsibility. *Strategic Management Journal*,
- Hallen, B. L. 2008. The Causes and Consequences of the Initial Network Positions of New Organizations: From Whom Do Entrepreneurs Receive Investments? *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 53(4): 685–718.
- Huffman, M. L., Cohen, P. N., & Pearlman, J. 2010. Engendering Change: Organizational Dynamics and Workplace Gender Desegregation, 1975–2005. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55(2): 255–277.
- Hultin, M., & Szulkin, R. 1999. Wages and Unequal Access to Organizational Power: An Empirical Test of Gender Discrimination. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44(3): 453–472.
- Hutton, I., Jiang, D., & Kumar, A. 2015. Political values, culture, and corporate litigation. *Management Science*, 61(12): 2905–2925.
- Jost, J. T. 2006. The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist*, 61(7): 651–670.
- Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. 2009. Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60(1): 307–337.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. 2003. Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3): 339–375.
- Kalev, A., Dobbin, F., & Kelly, E. 2006. Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies. *American Sociological Review*, 71(4): 589–617.
- Kane, E. W., & Whipkey, K. J. 2009. Predictors of Public Support for Gender-Related Affirmative Action Interests, Gender Attitudes, and Stratification Beliefs. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, nfp019.
- Kanter, R. M. 1977. *Men And Women Of The Corporation*. Basic Books.
- Kelly, E., & Dobbin, F. 1999. Civil rights law at work: Sex discrimination and the rise of maternity leave policies. *American Journal of Sociology*, 105(2): 455–92.
- Kinder, D. R., & Sanders, L. M. 1996. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals*. University of Chicago Press.
- King, D. C., & Matland, R. E. 2003. Sex and the grand old party an experimental investigation of the effect of candidate sex on support for a republican candidate. *American Politics Research*, 31(6): 595–612.
- King, G., & Zeng, L. 2001. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis*, 9(2): 137–163.
- Klein, E. 1986. *Gender Politics: From Consciousness to Mass Politics*. Harvard Univ Pr.
- Kravitz, D. A., & Klineberg, S. L. 2000. Reactions to two versions of affirmative action among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 85(4): 597–611.
- Kulis, S. 1997. Gender segregation among college and university employees. *Sociology of Education*, 151–173.
- Kurtulus, F. A., & Tomaskovic-Devey, D. 2012. Do female top managers help women to advance? A panel study using EEO-1 records. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 639(1): 173–197.
- Lawless, J. L., & Pearson, K. 2008. The primary reason for women’s underrepresentation? Reevaluating the conventional wisdom. *The Journal of Politics*, 70(1): 67–82.
- Leung. 2015. It’s not enough that Biogen has women on its board. It wants to help others do the same. *BostonGlobe.com*.
- Manski, C. F., & Lerman, S. R. 1977. The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Based Samples. *Econometrica*, 45(8): 1977–1988.
- Manza, J., & Brooks, C. 1999. *Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions*. OUP Oxford.

- Mason, K. O., & Lu, Y.-H. 1988. Attitudes toward women's familial roles: Changes in the United States, 1977-1985. *Gender & Society*, 2(1): 39-57.
- Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. 2011. Chipping Away at the Glass Ceiling: Gender Spillovers in Corporate Leadership. *American Economic Review*, 101(3): 635-39.
- McGinn, K. L., & Milkman, K. L. 2012. Looking Up and Looking Out: Career Mobility Effects of Demographic Similarity Among Professionals. *Organization Science*, 24(4): 1041-1060.
- Mindruta, D., Moeen, M., & Agarwal, R. 2016. A two-sided matching approach for partner selection and assessing complementarities in partners' attributes in inter-firm alliances. *Strategic Management Journal*, 37(1): 206-231.
- Oyer, P., & Schaefer, S. 2015. Firm/Employee Matching: An Industry Study of U.S. Lawyers. *ILR Review*.
- Pan, Y. 2015. The Determinants and Impact of Executive-Firm Matches. *Management Science*.
- Parkin, R., & Baker, G. 2006. The Changing Structure of the Legal Services Industry and the Careers of Lawyers. *North Carolina Law Review*, 84: 1635-1682.
- Peck. 2015. Salesforce CEO Takes Radical Step To Pay Men And Women Equally. *The Huffington Post*.
- Perry, E. L., Davis-Blake, A., & Kulik, C. T. 1994. Explaining gender-based selection decisions: A synthesis of contextual and cognitive approaches. *Academy of Management Review*, 19(4): 786-820.
- Phelps, E. S. 1972. The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. *The American Economic Review*, 62(4): 659-661.
- Phillips, D. J. 2002. A Genealogical Approach to Organizational Life Chances: The Parent-Progeny Transfer among Silicon Valley Law Firms, 1946-1996. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 47(3): 474-506.
- Phillips, D. J. 2005. Organizational Genealogies and the Persistence of Gender Inequality: The Case of Silicon Valley Law Firms. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 50(3): 440-472.
- Plutzer, E. 1988. Work Life, Family Life, and Women's Support of Feminism. *American Sociological Review*, 53(4): 640-649.
- Reskin, B. 1993. Sex segregation in the workplace. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 241-270.
- Reskin, B. F. 2000. Getting It Right: Sex and Race Inequality in Work Organizations. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 707-709.
- Reskin, B. F. 2003. Including Mechanisms in Our Models of Ascriptive Inequality: 2002 Presidential Address. *American Sociological Review*, 68(1): 1-21.
- Reskin, B. F., & Padavic, I. 1988. Supervisors as Gatekeepers: Male Supervisors' Response to Women's Integration in Plant Jobs. *Social Problems*, 35(5): 536-550.
- Ridgeway, C. L. 2001. Gender, status, and leadership. *Journal of Social Issues*, 57(4): 637-655.
- Ridgeway, C. L. 2013. Why status matters for inequality. *American Sociological Review*.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Correll, S. J. 2004. Unpacking the gender system a theoretical perspective on gender beliefs and social relations. *Gender & Society*, 18(4): 510-531.
- Ridgeway, C. L., & Smith-Lovin, L. 1999. The Gender System and Interaction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25: 191-216.
- Rosenwasser, S. M., & Dean, N. G. 1989. Gender role and political office: Effects of perceived masculinity/femininity of candidate and political office. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 13(1): 77-85.
- Sanbonmatsu, K. 2002. Gender stereotypes and vote choice. *American Journal of Political Science*, 20-34.
- Shenhay, Y., & Haberfeld, Y. 1992. Organizational demography and inequality. *Social Forces*, 71(1): 123-143.
- Sherer, P. D., & Lee, K. 2002. Institutional Change in Large Law Firms: A Resource Dependency and Institutional Perspective. *Academy of Management Journal*, 45(1): 102-119.
- Shinners, M. 2012. How to Become a Law Firm Partner. *American Bar Association*.

- Siegel, J. I., Pyun, L., & Cheon, B. Y. 2014. Multinational firms, labor market discrimination, and the capture of competitive advantage by exploiting the social divide. *Harvard Business School Strategy Unit Working Paper*, (11–011).
- Son Hing, L. S., Ramona, D., Zanna, M. P., Garcia, D. M., Gee, S. S., et al. 2011. The merit of meritocracy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101(3): 433–450.
- Sowell, T. 2007. *A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles*. Basic Books.
- Srivastava, S. B., & Sherman, E. L. 2014. Agents of Change or Cogs in the Machine? Re-examining the Influence of Female Managers on the Gender Wage Gap. *American Journal of Sociology*.
- Tajfel, H. 1982. Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33(1): 1–39.
- Tetlock, P. E. 2000. Cognitive biases and organizational correctives: Do both disease and cure depend on the politics of the beholder? *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 45(2): 293–326.
- Tilcsik, A. 2014. Imprint–environment Fit and Performance How Organizational Munificence at the Time of Hire Affects Subsequent Job Performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 59(4): 639–668.
- Tsui, A. S., Egan, T. D., & O’Reilly III, C. A. 1992. Being different: Relational demography and organizational attachment. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 549–579.
- Tsui, A. S., & O’reilly, C. A. 1989. Beyond Simple Demographic Effects: The Importance of Relational Demography in Superior-Subordinate Dyads. *Academy of Management Journal*, 32(2): 402–423.
- Williams, J. C., & Richardson, V. 2010. New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling-The Impact of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women. *Hastings LJ*, 62: 597.
- Winter, N. J. G. 2010. Masculine Republicans and Feminine Democrats: Gender and Americans’ Explicit and Implicit Images of the Political Parties. *Political Behavior*, 32(4): 587–618.

Table 1: Gender Role Attitudes and Political Ideology of Respondents to the General Social Survey, 2000-2014

Question name	Question text	% Respondents Supporting / Agreeing with the Statement							n	
		Extremely Liberal	Liberal	Slightly Liberal	Moderate	Slightly Conserv.	Conserv.	Extremely Conserv.		
<i>Gender and economic roles within the family</i>										
1 fechld	A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work	72%	76%	73%	73%	68%	60%	49%		10891
2 fepresch	A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works	32%	30%	35%	35%	41%	50%	61%		10809
3 femfam	It is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.	26%	24%	27%	33%	34%	50%	64%		10805
4 hubbywk1	A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.	34%	26%	23%	37%	39%	52%	61%		1215
<i>Organizational responses to gender inequality</i>										
5 fehire	Because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women.	85%	72%	62%	69%	61%	55%	55%		5344
6 fejobaff	Do you support the preferential hiring and promotion of women?	41%	38%	33%	34%	26%	24%	29%		5213
<i>Differences in leadership characteristics by gender</i>										
7 fepol	Most men are better suited emotionally for politics than are most women	13%	16%	17%	20%	24%	32%	43%		10350

Source: General Social Survey <http://www3.norc.org/Gss+website/>

Bolded cells are different from “Moderate” respondents at $p < .05$. Calculations include survey weights (wtssall). Unweighted trends are similar.

Table includes gender role questions with at least 1000 responses during the sample period. For additional questions with smaller samples, see GSS website.

Table 2: Summary Statistics: Law Offices in Hiring Analyses

	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	All Offices			Hiring Offices			Liberal Hiring Offices			Conserv. Hiring Offices		
	n	Mean	StDev	n	Mean	StDev	n	Mean	StDev	n	Mean	StDev
% law student hires, female	4015	0.470	0.346	4015	0.472	0.351	1989	0.485	0.346	788	0.441	0.387
% all associate hires, female	4015	0.450	0.326	4015	0.456	0.295	1989	0.466	0.283	788	0.432	0.337
% donations to Dem. by part. in office(\$)	6398	0.603	0.298	4015	0.608	0.288	1989	0.851	0.108	788	0.158	0.108
% donations to Dem. by male part. in office (\$)	6302	0.589	0.307	3958	0.593	0.297	1947	0.831	0.145	775	0.159	0.139
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office(\$)	4163	0.724	0.347	2817	0.734	0.334	1456	0.862	0.234	421	0.450	0.397
Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in office (\$)	6398	2591	4970	4015	2652	4653	1989	3924	6082	788	675	1183
Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in office (\$)	6398	1635	5154	4015	1726	5060	1989	710	1034	788	4078	10602
# law student hires	6398	3.752	8.981	4015	6.465	10.822	1989	7.112	12.447	788	4.086	6.444
# new associate hires, including laterals	6398	5.446	10.448	4015	8.745	12.469	1989	9.695	14.179	788	5.632	7.807
% partners in office from top law schools	6398	0.320	0.227	4015	0.336	0.222	1989	0.382	0.220	788	0.238	0.209
% partners in office, female	6398	0.182	0.130	4015	0.180	0.119	1989	0.186	0.120	788	0.169	0.142
# partners in office	6398	28.629	31.609	4015	34.323	34.540	1989	35.755	36.472	788	22.841	25.951
Office size (# attorneys)	6398	70.703	81.067	4015	88.059	90.328	1989	94.930	98.121	788	57.553	62.214
Avg age of partners in office	6398	50.100	3.422	4015	49.701	3.287	1989	49.754	3.291	788	49.297	3.719
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	6398	0.527	0.280	4015	0.568	0.305	1989	0.569	0.315	788	0.531	0.278
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	6398	0.878	0.513	4015	0.911	0.522	1989	0.977	0.567	788	0.790	0.440
% of female leadership among client personnel	6398	0.080	0.066	4015	0.079	0.067	1989	0.080	0.068	788	0.078	0.065
Firm acquires another firm	6398	0.116	0.320	4015	0.109	0.312	1989	0.102	0.303	788	0.127	0.333
Office is acquired	6398	0.013	0.115	4015	0.007	0.085	1989	0.009	0.092	788	0.008	0.087
San Francisco office	6398	0.046	0.209	4015	0.048	0.213	1989	0.070	0.256	788	0.029	0.168
NYC office	6398	0.106	0.308	4015	0.119	0.324	1989	0.161	0.368	788	0.042	0.200
DC office	6398	0.104	0.306	4015	0.113	0.317	1989	0.128	0.334	788	0.049	0.217
Office located in Southeastern US	6398	0.257	0.437	4015	0.245	0.430	1989	0.157	0.364	788	0.398	0.490

Level of analysis is the office-year

Liberal offices give two thirds of donations(\$) to Democrats

Conservative offices give two thirds of donations(\$) to Republicans

Donations take place from 1996-2006, sample covers 2007-2012.

Table 3: Correlation Table: Law Offices in Hiring Analyses

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
1 % associate hires, female	1.00																					
2 % donations to Dem. by part. in office(\$)	0.07	1.00																				
3 % donations to Dem. by male part. in office (\$)	0.05	0.91	1.00																			
4 % donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office(\$)	0.01	0.47	0.28	1.00																		
5 Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in office (\$)	0.01	0.31	0.30	0.12	1.00																	
6 Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in office (\$)	-0.07	-0.38	-0.33	-0.12	0.19	1.00																
7 # law student hires	-0.02	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.14	0.01	1.00															
8 # new associate hires(all)	-0.02	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.00	0.97	1.00														
9 % partners in office from top law schools	-0.03	0.31	0.31	0.21	0.20	-0.02	0.35	0.35	1.00													
10 % partners in office, female	0.06	0.04	0.04	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.12	-0.13	-0.08	1.00												
11 # partners in office	-0.04	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.13	0.05	0.47	0.50	0.25	-0.19	1.00											
12 Office size (# attorneys)	-0.05	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.18	0.02	0.64	0.67	0.38	-0.21	0.83	1.00										
13 Avg age of partners in office	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.05	-0.12	-0.13	0.01	-0.10	0.04	0.00	1.00									
14 Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.10	0.11	0.13	-0.04	0.01	0.07	-0.11	1.00								
15 Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	-0.06	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.20	0.02	0.35	0.33	0.52	-0.07	0.08	0.31	-0.17	0.26	1.00							
16 % of female leadership among client personnel	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.06	0.04	0.03	1.00						
17 Firm acquires another firm	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	-0.06	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.02	-0.01	-0.14	0.06	1.00					
18 Office is acquired	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.07	-0.04	-0.07	0.06	1.00				
19 San Francisco office	0.08	0.13	0.12	0.05	-0.05	-0.09	-0.04	-0.05	0.11	0.08	-0.13	-0.11	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.04	1.00			
20 NYC office	-0.01	0.14	0.14	0.11	0.05	-0.04	0.25	0.29	0.31	-0.12	0.07	0.28	0.00	-0.01	0.31	0.04	-0.04	0.00	-0.09	1.00		
21 DC office	0.02	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.10	0.10	0.00	-0.01	0.28	-0.03	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.00	0.09	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.09	-0.15	1.00	
22 Office located in Southeastern US	-0.03	-0.29	-0.27	-0.24	-0.08	0.06	-0.12	-0.13	-0.43	0.00	-0.12	-0.17	-0.15	0.00	-0.18	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.13	-0.22	-0.22	1.00

Level of analysis is the office-year. Sample includes offices who hire at least one associate and have political donation information for at least one partners of each gender. N=2,817

Table 4: Examining gender inequality in associate hiring. DV: % female law students hired in t+1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample
% donations to Dem. by part. in office(\$)	0.1159** (0.0401)	0.1563** (0.0433)			
Liberal office (>66% Don.(\$) to Dem.)			0.0221 (0.0227)		
Conserv. office (<33% Don.(\$) to Dem.)			-0.0894** (0.0335)		
% donations to Dem. by male part. in office (\$)				0.0907* (0.0430)	0.1057* (0.0467)
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in office(\$)				-0.0073 (0.0345)	0.0032 (0.0354)
# law student hires		0.0025** (0.0008)	0.0025** (0.0008)		0.0023** (0.0008)
Estimation	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit
Fixed effects	None	State	State	None	State
23 Legal specialty controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Other controls (see list below)	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
N office-year obs	4015	4015	4015	2760	2760
R-sq	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04
Log Likelihood	-3809.2	-3706.4	-3707.5	-2303.2	-2223.7
Mean of DV	0.472	0.472	0.472	0.471	0.471

Other controls include % partners from top law schools, % female partners in office, office size, avg. age of partners in office, firm size, profits per equity partner, % female leadership among client personnel, firm acquires another firm, and office is acquired.

Level of analysis is the office-year. Robust standard errors clustered on offices.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed tests.

Table 5: Robustness tests of gender inequality in associate hiring. DV: % female law students hired in t+1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Include lateral hires	Exclude Southern offices	Exclude NYC offices
% donations to Dem. by part. in office(\$)			0.1036+ (0.0608)	0.0808** (0.0290)	0.1465** (0.0464)	0.1828** (0.0467)
% don. to Dem. by white part. in off.(\$)		0.1424** (0.0434)				
Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in office (log\$)	0.0129 (0.0082)					
Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in office (log\$)	-0.0183** (0.0065)					
Estimation	Tobit	Tobit	OLS	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit
Fixed effects	None	State	Office	State	State	State
23 Legal specialty controls	None	Yes	Yes	None	None	None
Additional controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N office-year obs	4015	3996	4015	4015	3032	2401
R-sq	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04
Log Likelihood	-3707.5	-3690.6	-409.1	-2611.0	-2684.1	-2000.5
Mean of DV	0.472	0.472	0.472	0.456	0.481	0.471

Level of analysis is the office-year. All models contain additional controls noted in Table 5.

Robust standard errors clustered on offices. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed tests.

Table 6: Robustness tests for hiring: Examining interactions with associate quality. DV: 0/1 law student i is hired by law office j in year of graduation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full	Full
	sample	sample	sample	sample	sample	sample	sample	sample
Female student*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$)	0.3992*** (0.1165)		0.3549** (0.1192)	0.0065** (0.0024)	0.4353** (0.1452)	0.4276*** (0.1195)	0.3914*** (0.1175)	0.3998*** (0.1195)
Female*% don. to Dem. by male part. in office(\$)		0.3181** (0.1145)						
Female*% don. to Dem. by female part. in office(\$)		0.0531 (0.0893)						
Female*% don. to Dem. (\$) *Top 18 law school					-0.0551 (0.2183)			
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$) *Order of coif						-0.5321 (0.4543)		
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$) *Law review							0.1578 (0.4650)	
Female*% donations to Dem. *Count of quality signals								0.0113 (0.2069)
Female student	-0.4641 (0.3859)	-0.4824 (0.3858)	-0.5469 (0.4055)	-0.0067 (0.0077)	-0.5794 (0.3895)	-0.4877 (0.3862)	-0.4637 (0.3862)	-0.4610 (0.3865)
Estimation	Logit	Logit	CLogit	OLS	Logit	Logit	Logit	Logit
Fixed effects	None	None	Office- School- Year	Office- School- Year	None	None	None	None
Interactions w/ 'female' and additional controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N student-office obs	478462	478462	478462	478462	478462	478462	478462	478462
R-sq	0.01	0.01	0.00		0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01
Log Likelihood	-48635.6	-48635.1	-36150.5	261205.9	-47412.0	-48597.2	-48619.2	-48613.3
Mean of DV	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021	0.021

- Level of analysis is law student - law office pair. Dependent variable takes value of one when law office j hires law student i .
- Observations consistent of realized pairs and counterfactual pairs. Counterfactual (i.e. unrealized but possible) pairs are classmates of law students hired by law office j who joined other AmLaw200 firms in year of graduation. These students were interested in a job with a large law firm and were of sufficient quality to receive an offer, and thus they were likely to have been considered by law office j .
- Models include interactions w/'female' and 31 other firm and office characteristics(measured in year prior to graduation) including: % of partners from law school, firm size, profits, female clients, % partners who are female, partner avg. age, merger, % of partners in each of 23 legal specialties
- Models w/three way interactions include all lower order terms (i.e. two-way interactions), which are excluded for brevity.
- Robust standard errors clustered on offices in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed tests

Table 7: Summary Statistics: Associate Attorneys in Promotion Analyses

	(1) Female		(2) Male		(3) Liberal Prac. Area		(4) Centrist Prac. Area		(5) Conserv. Prac. Area	
	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean
Promoted to partner, t+1	39738	0.038	50369	0.066	48729	0.047	26845	0.060	14533	0.063
Female	39738	1.000	50369	0.000	48729	0.450	26845	0.432	14533	0.425
% donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	39738	0.642	50369	0.627	48729	0.839	26845	0.513	14533	0.168
Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	39738	6918	50369	5596	48729	9329	26845	3260	14533	1011
Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in prac area (\$)	39738	2387	50369	2456	48729	1229	26845	3095	14533	5197
% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac area (\$)	39206	0.626	49949	0.611	48057	0.820	26759	0.498	14339	0.164
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac area (\$)	29500	0.742	36881	0.736	37174	0.845	21159	0.658	8048	0.458
Tenure with firm	39738	4.033	50369	3.725	48729	3.775	26845	3.997	14533	3.896
Tenure is left-censored	39738	0.024	50369	0.013	48729	0.017	26845	0.019	14533	0.019
Years since JD	39738	8.088	50369	7.947	48729	8.005	26845	8.018	14533	8.006
Age	39738	34.861	50369	35.205	48729	35.031	26845	35.003	14533	35.220
Top 18 law school	39738	0.307	50369	0.320	48729	0.352	26845	0.291	14533	0.231
Order of the coif	39738	0.070	50369	0.073	48729	0.068	26845	0.072	14533	0.085
Judicial clerkship	39738	0.095	50369	0.103	48729	0.104	26845	0.092	14533	0.098
Law review	39738	0.126	50369	0.133	48729	0.129	26845	0.127	14533	0.139
Moot court	39738	0.052	50369	0.047	48729	0.046	26845	0.049	14533	0.059
Phi Beta Kappa	39738	0.062	50369	0.052	48729	0.060	26845	0.050	14533	0.054
% partners in office from attorney's law school	39738	0.082	50369	0.082	48729	0.075	26845	0.085	14533	0.099
Donations to Democrats by attorney (\$)	39738	531	50369	707	48729	769	26845	487	14533	422
Donations to Republicans by attorney (\$)	39738	493	50369	507	48729	524	26845	494	14533	436
Exits firms (any dest.)	39738	0.286	50369	0.273	48729	0.284	26845	0.280	14533	0.259
% associates in practice area who are female	39738	0.426	50369	0.412	48729	0.427	26845	0.412	14533	0.397
% partners in practice area who are female	39738	0.192	50369	0.176	48729	0.190	26845	0.181	14533	0.165
Avg age of partners in office	39738	50.552	50369	50.336	48729	50.505	26845	50.461	14533	50.131
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	39738	0.570	50369	0.567	48729	0.566	26845	0.575	14533	0.562
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	39738	1.058	50369	1.102	48729	1.146	26845	1.052	14533	0.926
% of female leadership among client personnel	39738	0.083	50369	0.081	48729	0.083	26845	0.081	14533	0.078
Firm acquires another firm	39738	0.082	50369	0.083	48729	0.076	26845	0.085	14533	0.099
Office is acquired	39738	0.007	50369	0.008	48729	0.008	26845	0.006	14533	0.010
San Francisco office	39738	0.047	50369	0.034	48729	0.056	26845	0.018	14533	0.022
NYC office	39738	0.204	50369	0.210	48729	0.265	26845	0.175	14533	0.074
DC office	39738	0.137	50369	0.139	48729	0.158	26845	0.138	14533	0.071
Office located in Southeastern US	39738	0.182	50369	0.195	48729	0.110	26845	0.245	14533	0.350
Observations	39738		50369		48729		26845		14533	

Level of analysis is the attorney-year. Sample consists of associates working for AmLaw 200 firms with at least 5 years of experience.

Liberal prac. area: partners give two thirds of donations(\$) to Democrats. Conservative prac. area: partners give two thirds of donations(\$) to Republicans

Table 8: Correlation Table: Associate Attorneys in Promotion Analyses

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
1 Promoted to partner, t+1	1.00																													
2 Female	-0.06	1.00																												
3 % donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	-0.04	0.03	1.00																											
4 Avg. donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	-0.01	0.00	0.21	1.00																										
5 Avg. donations to Repub. by part. in prac area (\$)	0.01	-0.01	-0.36	0.18	1.00																									
6 % donations to Dem. by male part. in prac area (\$)	-0.04	0.02	0.90	0.19	-0.32	1.00																								
7 % donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac area (\$)	-0.02	0.01	0.46	0.10	-0.12	0.26	1.00																							
8 Tenure with firm	0.08	0.05	-0.04	-0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.01	1.00																						
9 Tenure is left-censored	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.35	1.00																					
10 Years since JD	0.05	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.36	0.27	1.00																				
11 Age	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.27	0.20	0.70	1.00																			
12 Top 18 law school	-0.01	-0.02	0.11	0.06	-0.01	0.11	0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.06	-0.10	1.00																		
13 Order of the coif	0.03	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.05	1.00																	
14 Judicial clerkship	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.14	1.00																
15 Law review	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.04	-0.08	0.21	0.17	1.00															
16 Moot court	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.09	0.03	0.07	0.10	1.00														
17 Phi Beta Kappa	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.02	1.00													
18 % partners in office from attorney's law school	0.03	0.01	-0.08	-0.01	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	0.07	0.01	-0.06	-0.03	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	1.00												
19 Donations to Democrats by attorney (\$)	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	1.00											
20 Donations to Republicans by attorney (\$)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.10	1.00										
21 Exits firms (any dest.)	-0.10	0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.10	-0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	1.00									
22 % associates in office who are female	-0.03	0.05	0.11	0.02	-0.06	0.10	0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.02	0.00	0.02	1.00								
23 # partners in practice area	0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.00	-0.05	-0.07	0.10	0.02	0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.06	1.00							
24 % partners in practice area who are female	-0.01	0.07	0.04	-0.04	-0.07	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.03	-0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.13	-0.24	1.00						
25 Avg age of partners in office	-0.07	0.04	0.05	-0.02	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.16	0.01	0.16	0.11	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.16	0.14	-0.07	-0.05	1.00					
26 Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04	-0.08	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05	0.07	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.07	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.12	1.00				
27 Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	-0.04	-0.04	0.13	0.12	0.04	0.11	0.14	0.07	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05	0.25	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.06	0.01	-0.09	0.00	-0.01	0.06	-0.13	0.16	-0.11	-0.19	0.20	1.00			
28 % of female leadership among client personnel	-0.02	0.01	0.03	-0.04	-0.04	0.03	0.03	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.05	-0.02	0.02	0.10	0.00	0.04	1.00		
29 Firm acquires another firm	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.05	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.07	0.00	-0.05	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.15	0.01	1.00	
30 Office is acquired	-0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.08	-0.06	-0.06	0.05	1.00

Level of analysis is associate-year. N=39,738. Sample consists of associates working for AmLaw 200 firms with at least 5 years of experience.

Table 9: Examining gender inequality in associate promotion. DV: Associate attorney is promoted to partner in t+1

	(1) Full sample	(2) Full sample	(3) Liberal Prac. Area	(4) Centrist Prac. Area	(5) Conserv. Prac. Area	(6) Full sample
Female*% donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	0.0226*** (0.0058)	0.0217*** (0.0058)				
Female*% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac area (\$)						0.0237** (0.0074)
Female*% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac area (\$)						0.0051 (0.0058)
Female	-0.0409*** (0.0040)	-0.0416*** (0.0040)	-0.0219*** (0.0023)	-0.0333*** (0.0030)	-0.0379*** (0.0044)	-0.0488*** (0.0061)
% donations to Dem. by part. in prac area (\$)	-0.0133* (0.0054)	-0.0102+ (0.0054)				
% donations to Dem. by male part. in prac area (\$)						-0.0203** (0.0075)
% donations to Dem. by fem. part. in prac area (\$)						-0.0043 (0.0057)
Tenure with firm		0.0102*** (0.0006)	0.0093*** (0.0008)	0.0105*** (0.0009)	0.0142*** (0.0013)	0.0105*** (0.0007)
Tenure is left-censored		-0.0583*** (0.0095)	-0.0703*** (0.0128)	-0.0454** (0.0167)	-0.0821** (0.0264)	-0.0562*** (0.0114)
Years since JD		0.0056*** (0.0005)	0.0052*** (0.0005)	0.0062*** (0.0009)	0.0077*** (0.0012)	0.0058*** (0.0006)
Age		-0.0019*** (0.0003)	-0.0020*** (0.0003)	-0.0021*** (0.0005)	-0.0010 (0.0008)	-0.0020*** (0.0003)
% partners in office from attorney's law school			0.0115 (0.0084)	0.0200+ (0.0114)	0.0150 (0.0173)	0.0009 (0.0183)
Top 18 law school		0.0045** (0.0016)	0.0014 (0.0020)	0.0089** (0.0032)	0.0107* (0.0051)	0.0048* (0.0019)
Order of the coif		0.0121** (0.0033)	0.0126* (0.0047)	0.0162** (0.0062)	0.0095 (0.0081)	0.0158*** (0.0040)
Judicial clerkship		0.0068* (0.0029)	0.0048 (0.0040)	0.0057 (0.0053)	0.0187* (0.0073)	0.0044 (0.0035)
Law review		0.0080** (0.0025)	0.0057+ (0.0033)	0.0109* (0.0051)	0.0111+ (0.0064)	0.0087** (0.0030)
Moot court			0.0058 (0.0040)	0.0007 (0.0052)	0.0111 (0.0077)	0.0060 (0.0049)

Phi Beta Kappa	0.0015 (0.0033)	0.0045 (0.0041)	0.0024 (0.0070)	-0.0126 (0.0098)	0.0014 (0.0039)
Donations to Democrats by attorney (log\$)	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0003 (0.0004)	0.0008 (0.0007)	-0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0003 (0.0004)
Donations to Republicans by attorney (log\$)	0.0008 ⁺ (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0005 (0.0008)	0.0038 ^{**} (0.0012)	0.0010 ⁺ (0.0005)
% associates in office who are female	-0.0068 (0.0097)	-0.0025 (0.0127)	0.0086 (0.0206)	-0.0314 (0.0200)	-0.0136 (0.0141)
# partners in practice area	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0002)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0001)
% partners in practice area who are female	-0.0081 (0.0074)	-0.0015 (0.0096)	-0.0204 (0.0222)	-0.0334 (0.0225)	0.0022 (0.0140)
Avg age of partners in office	0.0092 ^{***} (0.0011)	0.0102 ^{***} (0.0013)	0.0093 ^{***} (0.0023)	0.0115 ^{***} (0.0026)	0.0126 ^{***} (0.0017)
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	0.0090 (0.0217)	0.0325 (0.0237)	0.0061 (0.0473)	-0.0187 (0.0452)	0.0168 (0.0259)
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	0.0029 (0.0113)	-0.0007 (0.0110)	-0.0146 (0.0263)	0.0352 ⁺ (0.0171)	0.0002 (0.0147)
% of female leadership among client personnel	0.0035 (0.0198)	0.0017 (0.0238)	-0.0154 (0.0390)	0.0282 (0.0581)	-0.0143 (0.0242)
Firm acquires another firm	-0.0072 ⁺ (0.0038)	-0.0072 (0.0048)	-0.0044 (0.0069)	-0.0122 (0.0087)	-0.0060 (0.0045)
Office is acquired	-0.0390 [*] (0.0152)	-0.0245 ^{***} (0.0061)	-0.0667 ⁺ (0.0360)	-0.0450 (0.0390)	-0.0622 ^{**} (0.0233)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Fixed effects	Office	Office	Office	Office	Office
23 Legal specialty dummies / Year dummies	No / No	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes
N atty-year obs	90107	90107	48729	26845	14533
Log Likelihood	9055.1	10051.9	8594.5	1852.1	924.2
Mean of DV / R-sq within	0.053 / 0.00	0.053 / .03	0.047 / .02	0.060 / .03	0.063 / .04
0.056 / .03					

Level of analysis is associate-year. Sample consists of all associates working for AmLaw 200 firms who have been out of law school ≥ 5 years.

Robust standard errors clustered on offices in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$, two-tailed tests

Table 10: Robustness tests for promotion analysis: DV: Associate attorney is promoted to partner in t+1

	(1) Full sample	(2) Full sample	(3) Full sample	(4) Full sample	(5) Exclude Southern offices	(6) Exclude NYC offices	(7) DV: Turnover
Female*Avg. don. to Dem. by part. in prac area (log\$)	0.0022*						
	(0.0009)						
Female*Avg. don. to Repub. by part. in prac area (log\$)	-0.0023**						
	(0.0007)						
Female*Change in partner liberalism from entry year to time t		0.0240*					
		(0.0110)					
Female*% don. to Dem. by male part. in prac area (\$)			0.3275*		0.0178*	0.0155+	-0.0323***
			(0.1606)		(0.0084)	(0.0085)	(0.0095)
Female*% don. to Dem. by fem. part. in prac area (\$)			-0.0650		0.0079	0.0026	0.0084
			(0.1201)		(0.0067)	(0.0065)	(0.0080)
Female*% don. to Dem. by white male part. in prac area (\$)				0.0247**			
				(0.0075)			
Female*% don. to Dem. by white fem. part. in prac area (\$)				0.0056			
				(0.0059)			
Female associate	-0.0295***	-0.0235***	-0.7715***	-0.0499***	-0.0444***	-0.0458***	0.0214**
	(0.0074)	(0.0018)	(0.1194)	(0.0062)	(0.0077)	(0.0067)	(0.0079)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	CLogit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Fixed effects	Office	Office	Office	Office	Office	Office	Office
23 Legal specialty dummies / Additional controls from Table 9	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes	Yes / Yes
N atty-year obs	90107	79207	59184	64429	53648	51116	94764
Log Likelihood	10050.2	9139.1	-11001.9	5906.1	6712.0	1828.0	-28749.8
Mean of DV / R-sq within	0.05 / .03	0.05 / .02	0.06 / .07	0.05 / .03	0.05 / .02	0.06 / .03	0.13 / .03

Level of analysis is the associate-year. Robust standard errors clustered on offices in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed tests. See Table 9 for list of additional controls (tenure, law school prestige, firm size, profits, female clients, etc.)

Table 11: Robustness tests in promotion analysis. Examining interactions with associate quality. DV: Associate attorney is promoted to partner in t+1

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$)*Top 18 law school	0.0159 (0.0124)				
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$)*Top 10 law school		0.0090 (0.0144)			
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$)*Order of coif			-0.0286 (0.0229)		
Female*% don. to Dem. by part. in office(\$)*Law review				0.0062 (0.0175)	
Female*% don. to Dem. (\$) *Count of accomplishments					0.0056 (0.0065)
Female associate	-0.0399*** (0.0045)	-0.0408*** (0.0043)	-0.0418*** (0.0041)	-0.0399*** (0.0043)	-0.0377*** (0.0045)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Fixed effects	Office	Office	Office	Office	Office
Additional controls / 23 Legal specialty dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N atty-year obs	90107	90107	90107	90107	90107
Log Likelihood	10054.9	10055.3	10056.1	10054.0	10055.7
Mean of DV	0.053 / .03	0.053 / .03	0.053 / .03	0.053 / .03	0.053 / .03

Level of analysis is the associate-year. Robust standard errors clustered on offices in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed tests

Models include lower order terms (i.e. all two-way interactions), but we exclude them for brevity.

See Table 9 for list of additional controls (age, tenure, firm size, profits, female clients, etc.)


Table 12: Robustness tests: Client team selection.

DV: Associate attorney is a member of partner attorney's team for a client deal (e.g. M&A, IPO transaction)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Full	Full	Full	Full	Male	Female
	sample	sample	sample	sample	partners	partners
Fem. assoc.*% don. to Democrats by partner(\$)	0.0081*	0.0080*	0.0094*	0.1162*	0.0093*	-0.0119
	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0042)	(0.0515)	(0.0042)	(0.0137)
Female associate*Female partner			0.0309**	0.3540**		
			(0.0117)	(0.1268)		
Fem. assoc.*Fem. part.*% don. to Dem. by part.(\$)			-0.0235+	-0.2636+		
			(0.0143)	(0.1554)		
Female associate	-0.0080**	-0.0067*	-0.0090**	-0.1129**	-0.0089**	0.0197+
	(0.0031)	(0.0031)	(0.0032)	(0.0396)	(0.0032)	(0.0113)
Deals by associate last year		0.0065***	0.0065***	0.0739***	0.0061***	0.0085***
		(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0056)	(0.0005)	(0.0017)
Top 18 law school		0.0005	0.0005	0.0094	0.0004	0.0010
		(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0197)	(0.0016)	(0.0051)
Order of the coif		0.0074*	0.0074*	0.0911*	0.0100**	-0.0166
		(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0400)	(0.0038)	(0.0121)
Judicial clerkship		-0.0081+	-0.0080+	-0.0851	-0.0135**	0.0561**
		(0.0048)	(0.0048)	(0.0533)	(0.0049)	(0.0212)
Law review		0.0007	0.0007	0.0151	0.0014	-0.0044
		(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0372)	(0.0034)	(0.0095)
Moot court		0.0076	0.0078	0.0866	0.0137	-0.0247
		(0.0080)	(0.0080)	(0.0854)	(0.0088)	(0.0186)
Phi Beta Kappa		0.0140**	0.0140**	0.1662***	0.0186***	-0.0388**
		(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0503)	(0.0049)	(0.0143)
Donations to Republicans by associate (log\$)		-0.0005	-0.0005	-0.0062	-0.0003	-0.0018
		(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0053)	(0.0005)	(0.0014)
Donations to Democrats by associate (log\$)		-0.0008*	-0.0008*	-0.0107*	-0.0007*	-0.0017
		(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0042)	(0.0003)	(0.0011)
Associate and partner, same law school		0.0046	0.0046	0.0589	0.0046	0.0055
		(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0373)	(0.0030)	(0.0113)
Estimation	OLS	OLS	OLS	CLogit	OLS	OLS
Fixed effects	Partner-Deal	Partner-Deal	Partner-Deal	Partner-Deal	Partner-Deal	Partner-Deal
N associate-deal obs	163750	163750	163750	163750	147388	16362
R-sq	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02
Log Likelihood	-21129.3	-21011.8	-21006.8	-35158.3	-18345.6	-2617.1
Mean of DV	0.098	0.098	0.098	0.098	0.097	0.104


- Choice set for each deal consists of all associates who share partner's office and practice area and have served on a deal in the last year.
- Teams are defined by attorneys who are attached to the same client for the same type of service, e.g. tax, anti-trust, etc., on a given deal
- Data stem from 4,316 unique client deals completed from 2007-2012. Median deal size is \$437M, median team has 1.2 partners and 2.5 associates.
- Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on partner-deals. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, two-tailed tests

Figure 1 - Gender Inequality in Hiring across Liberal and Conservative Practice Areas




Results come from Table 4 Model 9

Figure 2 - Gender Inequality in Promotion across Liberal, Centrist, and Conservative Practice Areas



Results are from Models 3-5 in Table 9

Figure 3 –Gender Inequality in Promotion Comparing Liberalism of Male and Female Partners



Results are from Model 6 of Table 9.

APPENDIX A: Linking Political Donation Data to Martindale Attorney Data

We obtain donation data from Bonica’s (2013) Database on Ideology, Money in Politics and Elections (“DIME”, data.stanford.edu/dime). See Bonica (2014) for a detailed discussion of these data. Political donations in state and federal elections of \$200 and above must be reported to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which then makes these donation data public. Bonica (2014) standardizes the FEC data. Each donation record provides the date and amount of donation, as well as the donor’s name, address, and employer. Information about the candidate or committee receiving the donation, including name, political party, and office sought is also included. We link donations to unique attorneys in the Martindale data using donor name, donor employer name, and donor location information in the DIME data to the same information about attorneys in Martindale data.

First, we extract all donors from the DIME data whose employer corresponds to an organization in the Martindale data, using exact string matching supplemented by fuzzy string matching using the Jarowinkler algorithm. We then link this subset of donors to specific attorneys in the Martindale data by matching their personal names, requiring an exact match on last name and using a fuzzy match on first name. When a donor matches more than one attorney in the same firm on the basis of name, we break ties using location information, assigning donations to attorneys who work in the same core based statistical area (CBSA) indicated by the donor in the DIME data. For a small number of donations (<1%), we encounter a donor who matches multiple attorneys working for the same firm in the same CBSA. We exclude these duplicates from the analyses, though results are robust to randomly assigning them to a matched attorney.

Our matching algorithm identifies at least one donation during the 1996-2006 period for about 50% partners and 30% of associates working the Am Law 200 firms. Bonica, Chilton & Sen (2015), who also match DIME data to attorneys in the Martindale data, find a comparable 43.5% donation rate across all ranks, giving us confidence in the quality of our matching procedure.

APPENDIX B: Variable descriptions

VARIABLE NAME	VARIABLES BY	DESCRIPTION	SOURCE
<i>Dependent variables</i>			
% female associates hired (H1)	Office-year	# female associates hired by law office in t+1 / total number of associates hired by law office in t+1	Martindale Hubbell
Law student is hired by law office (H1)	Attorney-office	Law student i's first affiliation is with law office j and occurs within two years of receiving law degree.	Martindale Hubbell
Associate is promoted (H2)	Individual-year	Associate appears as a partner in the same firm in the following year, or promotion is announced in press release	Martindale Hubbell; American Lawyer
Associate is selected for client team (Table 12)	Individual-deal	Associate's name is listed included among lawyers who worked a given merger transaction	Mergermarket
Associate exits the firm (Table 10)	Individual-year	Associate is no longer affiliated with the current employer in the following year	Martindale Hubbell
<i>Independent variables</i>			
Female	Individual	Is the attorney's first name female?	US Social Security Administration ^a
% donations to Dem. by part. in office(\$)	Office-year	Total don. (\$) to Democratic politicians (state and federal) by partners in office / total don. (\$) to Dem. and Repub.	DIME ^b
% donations to Dem. by part. in prac. area(\$)	Individual-year	Total don. (\$) to Dem. by part. in same prac.area and office / Total don. (\$) to Dem. & Repub	DIME
<i>Control variables</i>			
Top 18 law school	Individual	Did the attorney attend a top 18 law school? ^c	Martindale; US News
Order of the coif	Individual	Does the attorney mention "order of the coif" in her personal biography?	Martindale Hubbell
Judicial clerkship	Individual	Does the attorney mention working as a judicial clerk in her personal biography?	Martindale Hubbell
Law review	Individual	Does the attorney mention working as an editor of a law review in her personal biography?	Martindale Hubbell
Moot court	Individual	Does the attorney mention participating in moot court (i.e. mock trial) in her personal biography?	Martindale Hubbell
Phi Beta Kappa	Individual	Does the attorney mention Phi Beta Kappa in her personal biography?	Martindale Hubbell
Minority / Nonwhite	Individual	Attorneys name suggests that s/he is American Black, African, Middle Eastern, Asian, or Hispanic	Origins Info
Donations to Democrats by attorney (\$)	Individual	Sum of all donations (\$) to Democratic actors in state and federal elections, 1996-2006	DIME
Donations to Republicans by attorney (\$)	Individual	Sum of all donations (\$) to Republican actors in state and federal elections, 1996-2006	DIME
Age	Individual-year	Year - year of birth	Martindale Hubbell
Years since JD	Individual-year	Year - year of law school graduation	Martindale Hubbell
Tenure with firm	Individual-year	Year - first year observed with current firm	Martindale Hubbell
Tenure is left-censored	Individual-year	0/1, is first year with current firm<=1999?	Martindale Hubbell
% partners in office from attorney's law school	Individual-year	Part. from atty's law school in office and prac. area / total part in office and prac. area	Martindale Hubbell
% associates in prac. area who are female	Individual-year	Female assoc. in office and prac. area / total assoc. in office and prac. area	Martindale Hubbell
# male partners in practice area	Individual-year	# male partners in office and practice area	Martindale Hubbell
% partners in practice area who are female	Individual-year	Female partners in office and prac. area / total part. in office and prac. area	Martindale Hubbell
Avg age of male partners in prac area	Individual-year	Sum of age of male partners in office and prac. area / total male part. in office and prac. area	Martindale Hubbell
# new associate hires	Office-year	Count of associates who are affiliated with the firm for the first time	Martindale Hubbell
% partners in office from top law schools	Office-year	# partners with JD from top 18 law school in office / total partners in office	Martindale Hubbell
% partners in office, female	Office-year	# female partners in office / total partners in office	Martindale Hubbell
# partners in office	Office-year	# unique partners in office	Martindale Hubbell
Avg age of partners in office	Office-year	Sum of age of male partners in office / total part. in office	Martindale Hubbell
Office is acquired	Office-year	>50% of the partners in an office appear in a different, shared firm in the following year	Martindale Hubbell
% partners in each of 23 practice areas in App. C	Office-year	# partners who list practice area X / total partners in office (23 separate variables in regressions)	Martindale Hubbell
Firm size (# attorneys, 1000s)	Firm-year	Count of unique US-based attorneys	Martindale Hubbell
Profit per equity partner (\$1M)	Firm-year	Total profits / # equity partners	American Lawyer
% of female leadership among client personnel	Firm-year	# female top 5 executives among client firms / total top 5 executives among client firms ^d	American Lawyer; Execucomp
Firm acquires another firm	Firm-year	Firm makes an acquisition in the current year	American Lawyer

^a Data are supplemented with information from www.genderchecker.com. ^b Database on Ideology, Money in Politics and Elections (data.stanford.edu/dime; Bonica, 2014)

^c 18 schools have occupied the top 15 of the US News Law School Rankings since the ranking's inception: Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, NYU, Cal, Chicago, Penn, Northwestern, Michigan, Virginia, Cornell, Duke, Georgetown, Vanderbilt, Texas, UCLA, and Southern Cal.

^d This measure is weighted by the number of matters on which for law firm represents the client firm (e.g. antitrust, litigation, etc.).

Appendix C: Practice Areas: Associate Attorneys in Promotion Analyses

The Martindale data contain self-reported information on each attorney’s legal specialty. Attorneys can list multiple specialties in a given year. These 3,000 unique free-text strings were pared down to list of 26 cleaned legal specialties using a three step process. First, we matched the strings with an exact match to 215 different areas of practice provided by Martindale. For the last several years, Martindale has forced attorneys to choose specialties from this list. This exact match covered about 75% of the records in the data. Second, for those strings that did not match, a collaborator, who holds a JD from a top five law school and who worked for six years as an attorney before entering academia, matched the strings by hand to the list provided by Martindale, using his/her expert judgment to choose the most appropriate match. This matching process covered another 15% of the records in the data, for a total coverage of 90%. Remaining unmatched strings were coded as “Other”. In the third and final step, s/he matched the 215 areas of practice to a list of 25 areas of practice provided by MLAGlobal, a prominent legal consulting firm⁴, again using expert judgment. The table below displays the frequency of each specialty area in the sample.

	(1) Female		(2) Male		(3) Liberal Prac. Area		(4) Centrist Prac. Area		(5) Conserv. Prac. Area	
	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean
	Administrative	39738	0.041	50369	0.043	48729	0.038	26845	0.046	14533
Bankruptcy	39738	0.038	50369	0.046	48729	0.043	26845	0.038	14533	0.047
Civil rights	39738	0.010	50369	0.007	48729	0.007	26845	0.009	14533	0.011
Corporate	39738	0.355	50369	0.413	48729	0.365	26845	0.464	14533	0.321
Criminal	39738	0.020	50369	0.023	48729	0.024	26845	0.020	14533	0.019
Education	39738	0.004	50369	0.002	48729	0.002	26845	0.003	14533	0.005
Energy	39738	0.016	50369	0.019	48729	0.014	26845	0.019	14533	0.028
Entertainment	39738	0.018	50369	0.018	48729	0.020	26845	0.018	14533	0.011
Environmental	39738	0.040	50369	0.034	48729	0.037	26845	0.035	14533	0.041
Family	39738	0.005	50369	0.002	48729	0.004	26845	0.002	14533	0.002
General practice	39738	0.003	50369	0.002	48729	0.002	26845	0.003	14533	0.003
Government	39738	0.035	50369	0.039	48729	0.035	26845	0.040	14533	0.036
Healthcare	39738	0.028	50369	0.018	48729	0.021	26845	0.024	14533	0.024
Immigration	39738	0.012	50369	0.006	48729	0.007	26845	0.011	14533	0.009
Insurance	39738	0.038	50369	0.041	48729	0.040	26845	0.037	14533	0.045
Intellectual property	39738	0.117	50369	0.167	48729	0.142	26845	0.147	14533	0.150
International	39738	0.009	50369	0.009	48729	0.009	26845	0.011	14533	0.008
Labor	39738	0.137	50369	0.085	48729	0.091	26845	0.105	14533	0.170
Litigation	39738	0.417	50369	0.415	48729	0.438	26845	0.378	14533	0.412
Military	39738	0.000	50369	0.001	48729	0.001	26845	0.001	14533	0.000
Native populations	39738	0.001	50369	0.001	48729	0.001	26845	0.001	14533	0.001
Personal injury	39738	0.005	50369	0.005	48729	0.003	26845	0.005	14533	0.010
Real estate	39738	0.093	50369	0.099	48729	0.094	26845	0.090	14533	0.114
Tax	39738	0.042	50369	0.043	48729	0.040	26845	0.043	14533	0.048
Trusts and estates	39738	0.023	50369	0.015	48729	0.016	26845	0.019	14533	0.023
Observations	39738		50369		48729		26845		14533	

Level of analysis is the attorney-year.

Liberal prac. area: partners give two thirds of donations(\$) to Democrats.

Conservative prac. area: partners give two thirds of donations(\$) to Republicans

Donations take place from 1996-2006, sample covers 2007-2012.

⁴ <http://www.mlaglobal.com/community/thought-leadership/practice-area-summary>