Bringing the Boss's Politics In:

Supervisor Political Ideology and the Gender Gap in Earnings

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Abstract: The gender gap in earnings and rewards remains persistent across many professional and managerial work contexts. In these settings, where there are few objective criteria for performance and organizational mechanisms are weak, we propose that personal political values can serve as a powerful influence on whether supervisors reduce or enhance inequalities in performance-based rewards. We develop theory about how political liberalism versus conservatism, reflecting different views on social inequality and social change, affect supervisors' perceptions and allocative decision making. Combining internal personnel and billings data with publicly-available political donation records in a large law firm, we test the effect of political ideology among supervising law firm partners on the performance-based bonuses awarded to male and female subordinate lawyers. We find the male-female gender gap in performance-based pay is reduced for professional workers tied to liberal supervisors, relative to conservative supervisors. We further find this political ideology effect increases for workers with greater seniority in the organization. Our findings contribute to an understanding of the determinants of the gender earnings gap, suggesting that in settings where managers have leeway over rewards and careers, their personal political beliefs have an important influence on outcomes for male and female workers. [197 words]

Although gradually closing over time, the gender gap in earnings continues to persist among American workers, especially in professional and managerial occupations where the rewards tend to be greatest (Thompson 2014; Catalyst, 2016). For example, according to recent estimates, the highest-paid female executives at S&P 500 companies make 18 percent less than male executives, and female CEOs make less than 80 percent of what male CEOs make (Albanesi, Olivetti, & Prados, 2015). Identifying ways to address this persistent gender inequality has been a central concern for organizational scholars (Baron & Bielby, 1980; Reskin, 1988). An important historical focus in this literature has been to document how organizational practices, norms, and workforce demographic composition serve to enable or constrain managerial gender bias in decision-making and reward allocation (e.g., Elvira & Graham, 2002; Hultin & Szulkin, 1999). However, across many managerial and professional contexts, where supervisors have wide latitude in allocating rewards and performance criteria are subjective, these norms and practices on their own appear to be only having a limited effect in reducing gender-based disparities in outcomes.

More recently, there has been a shift in emphasis toward bringing "managers back in" in order to further understand the prevalence and persistence of earnings inequality between men and women (Castilla, 2011; Reskin 2003). This shift reflects the rise of post-bureaucratic organizations characterized by market oriented employment practices, such as performance-based pay, which enhance the scope for supervisory discretion in the hiring, selecting, rewarding and promoting of men and women (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo & Sterling, 2013; Cappelli, 2008; Castilla, 2012). These developments put the spotlight on supervisors with discretion, suggesting researchers focus on factors that influence these individuals' evaluation and reward patterns. In particular, we argue these developments elevate our need for understanding about how supervisors' personal values and preferences influence their performance evaluations and reward allocations among men and women.

To what extent do personal values guide the decision-making of supervisor who evaluate performance and determine rewards among workers--and to what extent does this decision-making process mitigate or enhance gender inequality in organizations? Despite growing interest in the role of personal values in decision-making at all levels in organizations (Chin, Hambrick and Trevino, 2013; Briscoe, Chin and Hambrick, 2014), management research remains surprising quiet on this question. Instead, organizational scholars have emphasized demographic similarity between managers and employees as a proxy for bias in evaluations and reward allocations. Indeed, research on managerial discretion in this domain has focused mostly on one source of bias, male homophily, which is the tendency for male managers to favor other men in their subjective appraisals and workplace decisions. While there is some evidence in support of male homophily in the workplace (e.g. Brass, 1985; Ibarra, 1992), other studies suggest limits to the homophily effect. These studies find that both women and men enact gender bias in the workplace (e.g. Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska & George, 2004; Duguid, 2011; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1993). Across many contexts, prevalent male-typed schemas for success (Heilman, 2001; Eagly & Karau, 2002, Schein, 1973) are carried into performance evaluation and reward allocation decisions by *both* male and female supervisors (e.g., Duguid, 2011) such that homophily alone is unlikely to predict variability in these decisions.

Moving beyond homophily-based arguments, in this article we hope to shift the focus of organizational research on gender inequality toward another compelling and equally relevant explanation for persistent gender gap in organizational rewards – the supervisor's political ideology. Although it may be argued that a wide swath of beliefs and values can play a role in guiding managerial decisions, political ideology provides a particularly compelling framework for organizing personal beliefs that can shape a supervisor's rewards allocation and performance evaluations choices in managerial contexts. Political ideology is defined as "an interrelated set of attitudes and values about the proper goals for society and how they should be achieved" (Tedin, 1987: 65). These attitudes and values, rooted in childhood and early adult socialization experience, have been linked to systematic variations in a wide array of apolitical beliefs about tradition, flexibility, chaos, and conformity (Jost, Nosek and Gosling, 2008; Nosek et al., 2007) as well as lifestyle choices, consumer preferences and leisure behavior (DellaPosta, Shi, & Macy, 2015). In open societies, distinct political ideologies coexist, and individuals subscribing to a given ideology may join and support corresponding political parties. For example, the most historically important dimension of ideology in the United States is the liberalism-conservatism axis, which is reflected in the two dominant political parties. This axis encompasses beliefs among liberals (vs. conservatives) that entail rejecting inequality (vs. acceptance of inequality), and embracing social change (vs. preferring the status quo) (Jost, et al 2008).

Over the past several decades in the United States, social and economic views have become increasingly polarized along this ideological axis (Fienberg & Willer, 2015). The impact of these beliefs is perhaps most visibly manifest through their role in determining governmental policies and legislative initiatives at a broad societal level. However, recently management scholars have begun to document evidence about how these beliefs trickle into day-to-day decision-making within organizations as well (Chin, et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014). Indeed, Chin, Hambrick & Trevino (2013) recently found that the political liberalism versus conservatism of senior executives shaped corporate investments in social-responsibility practices such as environmental protection and workplace diversity promotion. More recently, Gupta and colleagues (2016) found that the political liberalism of employees at lower levels also had a systematic influence on decision making related to social-responsibility practices. The upshot of this research is that unlike overt demographic attributes or even dispositions, political beliefs and preferences are not often easily observable in managers and executives, and might therefore "creep or seep into their (decisions) without fan-fare or even much on-going awareness by observers" (Chin et al., 2013: 199).

We argue that political ideology, while applicable to all types of managerial decisions, is particularly relevant for understanding gender inequality in professional and managerial contexts. In a recent meta-analysis, Joshi and colleagues (2015) found that the reward gap was indeed the highest in these contexts (Joshi, Son & Roh, 2015). In these settings, managers have a great deal of discretion over worker evaluation and rewards, because causal links between worker effort and performance are uncertain, limiting the use of objective indicators of worker performance, and increasing the need for managers' subjective evaluations as a primary basis for determining rewards and career advancement (Gorman, 2005). Further, when afforded such high levels of discretion, managers have been found to enact prevailing male-typed schema in their decision-making; indeed, the presence of these schema has been viewed as an explanation for persistent gender inequality (Heilman, 2001; Eagly & Karau, 2002, Schein, 1973). Occupations and jobs are considered male-typed if they are characterized by a high degree of status and authority, and have been historically occupied by men (Ragins & Sundstorm, 1989; Schein, 1973). Distinctly male-type attributes, such as self-confidence, assertiveness, aggression and ambition, are associated with success in these managerial and professional roles (Schein, 1973). This male-typed schema for success--popularly termed the "think manager think male" phenomenon--has received wide support across field and laboratory settings (e.g., Heilman, Block, Martell & Simon, 1989; Schein, 2001).

Yet high levels of manager discretion do not necessarily imply that all managers will enact male-typed schema to the same extent. Instead, managers are likely to vary in how much they perpetuate or embrace these schema according to their own personal values and beliefs. More specifically, supervisor beliefs about social change and inequality in society – primary elements in ideological liberalism versus conservatism – can have direct bearing on evaluative and allocative decision making in managerial contexts (e.g. Mason & Lu 1988; Bryant 2003). Therefore, we view a supervisor's political ideology as an ex ante and exogenous influence on his or her decision making in these settings. Integrating sociological research on the role of managerial discretion with recent work in political psychology, we develop the argument that liberal versus conservative supervisors are likely to differ in their perception and interpretation of employee performance when making allocative and evaluative decisions (Tetlock, Vieider, Patil & Grant, 2013). Extending this research to male-dominated work contexts, liberal supervisors are more likely to rely on information that gives the benefit of the doubt to female workers, as a way of rejecting or resisting the prevailing male-typed schema, and curbing inequalities that are linked to those schema and the systems that perpetuate them. In contrast, conservative supervisors are apt to rely on information that is consistent with the male-type schema, viewing any gender differences as products of a legitimate system that rewards individuals based on human capital and motivational differences.

Below, we develop specific hypotheses about how liberalism (vs. conservatism) among supervisors influences the gender gap in allocations of performance-based pay (i.e. bonuses). Drawing on the liberal-conservative distinction with respect to advocating (vs. resisting) social change and accepting (vs. rejecting) inequality, we hypothesize that greater supervisor liberalism will reduce the gender gap in performance-based pay. We also examine whether the effect of supervisor liberalism changes with worker seniority, and whether a supervisor's ideology effect is influenced by the degree of ideological alignment with the supervisor's immediate workplace context. We test these ideas using unique data on workers who are associate lawyers being supervised by partners in a large U.S. law firm over a period of six years. This is a suitable setting for our purposes, for three reasons. First, the quality of worker output tends to be highly uncertain in this setting, with few objective indicators available for use by supervisors or others assessing performance (Parsons 1939; von Nordenflycht 2010) - meaning supervisors can (and must) exercise personal discretion in evaluating workers and assigning any performance-based rewards (Gorman, 2006). Second, the structure of law firm work and recordkeeping allows us to statistically identify the effect of supervisor attributes on worker outcomes, since workers are assigned to multiple supervisors in each year, and supervisors' subjective evaluations are the primary inputs to workers' performance-based pay allocations. Third, we are able to identify the political ideologies of the great majority of supervisors in our setting using an unobtrusive, objective, validated indicator based on political party campaign donations. Our findings contribute to advancing an understanding of the determinants of the gender earnings gap, suggesting that in settings where managers have leeway over rewards and careers, their personal political beliefs have an important influence on outcomes for male and female workers.

SOURCES OF GENDER INEQUALITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL REWARDS

Research on gender inequality has attributed the effects of managerial discretion on earnings differences between men and women to three interrelated causal mechanisms: in-group favoritism, male homophily, and male-typed schemas for leadership and success (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs & Tomkins, 2004; Ibarra, 1992). The first two mechanisms, in-group favoritism and homophily based on demographic attributes of managers and their subordinates, have received significant attention in sociological, management and organizational psychology literatures (e.g., Bartol, 1999; Sackett, Dubois & Noe, 1991; Tsui & O'Reilly, 1989). Yet empirical evidence is mixed on the effects of supervisor-subordinate demographic similarity as a proxy for bias in evaluation and reward allocation (e.g. Maume 2011; Rivera, Soderstrom and Uzzi 2010). Sex similarity between managers and subordinates has not emerged as a significant predictor of employment outcomes such as performance, turnover or satisfaction for female subordinates either (Riordan, 2003).

Related to this, the demographic composition of managerial ranks also does not fully account for the gender gap in earnings and promotions. Although some researchers have found that gender diversity in higher ranks reduces turnover and lowers the pay gap among non-managerial female employees (Cohen & Huffman, 2007; Hultin & Szulkin, 2003; Joshi, Liao & Jackson, 2006), more recently researchers have uncovered a contrary pattern. In contrast to the cross-establishment or cross-sectional data used in past research, a fine-grained analysis of personnel records from a large information technology firm led Srivastava and Sherman (2015) to conclude there was no support for the proposition that female supervisors reduced the gender wage gap among their direct reports. Moreover, among a sub-set high performing supervisors and low performing subordinates, switching from a male to a female supervisor led to lower salaries among women but not among men (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015). Bednar & Gicheva (2014) also recently called into question this emphasis on demographic similarity between managers and employees as a proxy for bias in evaluations and reward-allocations. As part of their research, in a study on supervisor-subordinate relationships among athletics managers, they found that when all other differences across managers were accounted for, gender matching did not affect subordinate performance. Rather, the 'female-friendliness' of managers (which did not vary by gender) predicted the propensity to hire and retain female middle-managers. These findings suggest the need to re-evaluate the focus on gender similarity to the supervisor or gender diversity among higher ranks for reducing gender inequality in earnings.

There are other reasons to question the emphasis on demographic attributes of managers as predictors of managerial decision-making as well. In male-dominated settings, such as the professional services firm we studied, sex differences among managers may not influence decision-making as much, because female managers also often subscribe to prevailing beliefs about status, thus distancing themselves from other females and aligning themselves with managers in the (male) dominant group (Chattopadhyay et al., 2004; Ellemers et al., 1993; Joshi, 2014; Tajfel, 1982). For example, laboratory research shows that women may be predisposed to maintain their distinctiveness and will abdicate the opportunity to advocate for other highly qualified women entering high prestige work groups (Duguid, 2011). Ely's (1995) analysis of law firms also showed that in male-dominated firms, sex role stereotypes about women were more problematic and women evaluated other women less favorably than they did men. In the male-dominated context of scientists and engineers, Joshi (2014) found that not all men were equally biased in their expertise evaluations of female group members either; men who identified less with their gender were also less likely to make expertise evaluations based solely on gender. These findings suggest that in many instances, gender (dis)similarity – based on the notion of in-group preference – may not fully explain gender bias is reward allocation decisions. Hence, we look beyond in-group favoritism and related homophily based mechanisms to understand the sources of supervisory gender bias in managerial and professional settings.

Theories of male-typing of jobs and roles in organizations have also offered a compelling and long established rationale for gender bias in organizational rewards (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001). Schein's classic work (1973; 1975) on the masculine construal of leadership demonstrated that successful managers are assigned distinctly male type attributes--such as self-confident, assertive, aggressive and ambitious--by both male and female respondents. This implicit leadership bias, popularly termed the "think manager think male" phenomenon, has received wide spread support across field and laboratory settings (e.g., Heilman et al., 1989; Schein, 2001). Implicit theories of who can be a successful manager or leader in organizations are often developed outside the organization through early personal experiences and socialization (Liben, Bigler & Krogh, 2001). Male-type schemas have been found to exist for a range of professional and managerial occupations, including legal services (Gorman 2005; Levinson and Young 2010), medicine (Burgess, Joseph, van Ryn and Carnes 2012) science and engineering (Etzkowitz, Kelmegor and Uzzi 2000; DiTomaso, Post, Smith, Farris, and Cordero, 2007), and corporate management (e.g., Heilman et al., 2004). Across these contexts, objective indicators of performance are limited, and supervisors must rely on subjective evaluations for determining rewards and career advancement -- conditions under which the use of prevailing male-typed schemas in managerial decision-making are predicted to contribute to persistent gender inequality (Joshi, et al., 2015).

However, the use of these schemas is likely to be constrained by the supervisor's personal values when he or she exercises discretion in allocating rewards to and evaluating the performance of male and female workers in managerial and professional contexts. Therefore, a systematic understanding of the role of supervisors' values in perpetuating or limiting the role of these schema warrants greater attention. To examine this, we turn to supervisor beliefs about social change and inequality in society – that is, the supervisor's ideological liberalism (versus conservatism) – which has direct bearing on evaluative and allocative decision making in managerial contexts.

The Political Ideology of Supervisors and Gender Bias in Performance-based Pay

Although male-types schemas for jobs and roles have been widely observed, (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman, 2001), there is less known about which individuals are most likely to accept and enact them in organizational field settings. One potential source of individual variance in endorsing these schemas is the personal value system. Like schemas for successful managers and professionals, personal values are rooted in broader extra-organizational socialization influences that individuals bring with them into specific workplaces. Although a wide array of personal values may influence managerial decisions, the concept of political ideology provides a well-established organizing framework for examining an individual's values, beliefs and preferences (Jost et al., 2008).

The liberal-conservative (left-right) distinction, defined earlier, has been viewed as the most prominent classification of political ideology in the Western world since the time of the French revolution when the supporters of the monarchy sat of the right side and those who were opposed to the regime sat on the left side of the legislative chambers (Jost et al., 2008). In the present era these distinctions remain highly salient; indeed, overlapping political and cultural polarization in the United States has led sociologists to document correlations between political ideology and a wide range of aesthetic and leisure preferences, consumer behaviors, moral attitudes and lifestyles (DellaPosta, Shi, Macy, 2015). Liberalism-conservativism also predicts explicit preferences such as how social equality can be achieved, how welfare and social security policies can be designed, and the value of affirmative action legislation (Bobbio, 1996; Kerlinger, 1984; Kluegel & Smith, 1986).

How do generic and seemingly gender-neutral ideological preferences "creep or seep" into everyday evaluative and allocative decisions about male and female workers in organizations? Through a general process known as *motivated cognition*, personal values can influence a wide range of managerial behaviors, as individuals inject their values into their everyday decision-making as a way to provide reasonable justifications for the conclusions that they *want* to arrive at (Kunda, 1990). In other words, through motivated cognition, managers have a tendency to "see and hear what one wants to see and hear" (Higgins & Molden, 2003). More specifically, under conditions of uncertainty that typify many occasions for managerial decision-making, motivated cognition operates through the "perceptual filtering" of environmental stimuli such that information which is most consistent with one's beliefs is most likely to be recognized and retained (England, 1967; Chin et al., 2013). In the context of high uncertainty that characterizes professional and managerial work – with multiple pathways to getting work done, multiple solutions to a problem, and weak causal links between worker actions and desired outcomes (Gorman 2006) – perceptual filtering is the process by which supervisors will selectively draw on information that fits their personal beliefs and perceive and interpret this information based on these beliefs.

Political ideology, as a reflection of personal beliefs, is likely to guide perceptual filtering when managers make evaluative and allocative decisions because it directly pertains to preferences about how rewards should be distributed in society. Research shows that liberals tend to make external attributions and believe that forces external to the individual are a primary explanation of how rewards are distributed in society—consistent with the view that the socio-economic system needs to be rectified in order to address income inequalities. In contrast, conservatives tend to make internal attributions and explain the unequal distribution of resources in society via factors that lie primarily within individuals—consistent with the view that economic inequalities reflect individuals' differing abilities and motivations to succeed, rather than flaws in the socio-economic system (Thomas 1970; Gurin, Gurin and Morrison 1976). Recent evidence supports the notion that these internal versus external attributions are injected into evaluative decision-making heuristics. In a series of experiments, Tetlock and colleagues (2013) showed that conservatism-liberalism explained significant variance in managers' attributions of performance outcomes. Whereas liberal managers tended to focus on and make decisions based on external attributions for performance outcomes (e.g., the system governing an employee's accountability needs addressing), conservative managers were apt to focus on factors internal to the employee (e.g., he/she is a free rider or not trustworthy). This effect was even stronger when the link between effort and outcome was uncertain (Tetlock, et al., 2013).

Translated into the microcosm of workplaces that are overwhelmingly male-dominated and where male-typed norms of success are prevalent, the process of perceptual filtering leads liberal supervisors to make external attributions -- and the conservative supervisor to make internal attributions -- as they assess the outcomes of men and women. When liberal supervisors, guided by a value system that rejects inequality and embraces change, engage in perceptual filtering, they may tilt toward attributing the performance outcomes of a male worker in part to workplace norms and practices that have traditionally favored men, giving the benefit of the doubt to a female worker who has had to overcome systemic barriers to perform at equal levels. For example, perceptual filtering may lead the liberal to recall and focus on information about of how a male subordinate was mentored by a powerful partner in the firm, and a female subordinate of equal talent was not. Therefore, in evaluating and rewarding male and female subordinates who are roughly equal in observable characteristics and performance, liberal supervisors will be inclined to allocate rewards equally and, given uncertainty, tilt in favor of the female subordinate as a way to balance the playing field.

In contrast, the process of perceptual filtering leads conservative supervisors to draw on different heuristics while making evaluative or allocative decisions. Conservatives will tend to view existing workplace norms and practices (e.g., working over weekends or networking at a bar) as unproblematic, and attribute any unequal outcomes to individual internal differences in human capital or motivation. The conservative may focus on the more immediate indicators of differential commitment or performance (e.g., working at the office over the weekend), without considering whether or not they inherently favor men. As a result, conservative supervisors will be more accepting of differences in outcomes between men and women that preserve the status-quo, and of attendant inequality that is consistent with the male-typed schema.

In sum, from the plethora of ambiguous information available for use in differentiating among subordinates, perceptual filtering will lead conservative and liberal supervisors to focus on different pieces of information, and use that information differently, in a manner that aligns with their personal beliefs.[1] Our arguments lead us to propose:

> *Hypothesis 1: Supervisor liberalism will reduce the gender gap in performance-based pay, such that the gap will be smallest at high levels of supervisor liberalism and largest at low levels of supervisor liberalism.*

[1]These contrasting perceptions and inclinations--rooted in ideology--can affect outcomes for subordinate professional workers through multiple supervisor behaviors. Here, we are interested in how these differences emerge in the subjective evaluations that comprise the performance-based reward allocation process. Below, in additional analyses, we also explore how these same tendencies may influence supervisor decisions about allocating men and women differing access to valuable work opportunities (including billable hours).

Below, we detail two additional contingencies that may shape the effects of supervisor ideology on performance-based pay – one emerging from changes in the worker's seniority, as he or she comes closer to joining the leadership ranks of the organization – and the other emerging from contextual normative pressures that a supervisor may encounter while exercising his or her discretion in the workplace.

Worker Seniority and the Effects of Supervisor Political Ideology

When supervisors evaluate and reward their most junior subordinates, their decisions primarily influence the fate of the worker (not the organization, or the supervisor's own place within it). Yet as professional and managerial workers gain seniority, supervisor evaluations will increasingly determine the likelihood that these workers will be allowed to join the leadership or upper echelons of the organization, sharing in the status and rewards that accompany those positions. Because evaluations and rewards for senior workers carry this additional implication, supervisors may be expected to approach them differently.

Theories about the male-typed schemas for jobs and roles that we outlined above are also relevant for understanding how supervisors respond to women as they gain seniority in organizations. In particular, as women acquire seniority and near eligibility for leadership positions in male-dominated organizations, they would have demonstrated their ability to be successful in a "man's world". One would assume that having lasted in their roles and developed a track record for performance, they would be able to overcome biased attributions of their performance. Indeed, there is some support for this view. Across a series of experiments Rossette and Tost (2010) found that women in high-level positions received more favorable ratings than men in these roles and these favorable ratings were based on perceptions of double standards – that is, respondents rated women more favorably because they perceived that women in these roles had had to overcome stricter requirements to rise to these positions.

But there have been contrary trends in the research as well (e.g., Heilman et al., 2004). Research shows that as women climb the corporate ladder moving from lower to middle and upper level management positions they face even more bias (Lyness & Heilman, 2004). Testing a "penalties for success" theory for women, across a series of experiments, Heilman and colleagues (2004) demonstrated that women who are identified as successful were less liked and more personally derogated than successful men; these negative reactions were more likely for male-typed tasks; being disliked influenced reward allocation decisions about successful women. Examining the performance evaluations and promotions among male and female managers, Lyness and Heilman (2006) reported based on a sample of over four hundred upper level managers that the bar for receiving a promotion was significantly higher for women than men. Recent research also finds that senior women in male-dominated settings are likely to be even more atypical than junior women, potentially triggering stronger feelings of backlash from individuals who want to maintain the status quo (Joshi, 2014; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, Naut, 2012).

For associates in law firms, gaining seniority increases the chances that they will be made partners in the firm, joining an inner circle that collectively represents the firm, governs it, and shares in its profits. In this high-stakes context, one would expect that the "penalties for success" theory is even more likely to have consequences for gender-biased reward allocation decisions. However, these negative outcomes for senior women are also likely to be contingent on their supervisor's personal values. Based on the preceding theoretical logic, we propose that the perceptual filtering mechanism that draws on a supervisor's liberalism (conservatism) is consequential for the evaluation and rewarding of men and women at the senior level for two reasons. First, the complexity and uncertainty of work itself is likely to increase with greater seniority, increasing the scope for discretion and any attendant bias originating with the supervisor. This change is likely to reinforce the ideological effect outlined above. Second, even though more-senior workers are likely to have accumulated more of a performance record, in professional and managerial work, as tasks become more complex and non-routine with seniority, past performance information is less likely to guide allocative decision-making (Gorman, 2005). In these situations liberal supervisors may be even more likely to provide the benefit of the doubt to senior women who they believe have had to overcome considerable odds to survive in an environment where male-typed norms and schemas for success prevail. Conservative supervisors, on the other hand, may not see senior women as a fit for leadership and high status roles in the organization surmising that the male-dominated leadership ranks are a reflection of higher motivation and leadership skills among men. These arguments suggest that the liberalism versus conservatism effect on senior workers will be greater than the effect on junior workers. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2: Worker seniority will increase the effects of supervisor liberalism on the gender gap in performance-based pay. Specifically, for workers with more seniority, the conservative-liberal difference in the gender gap will be greater, relative to workers with less seniority.*

Workplace Constraints on the Effects of Supervisor Political Ideology

Although personal political beliefs tend to be deeply engrained within individuals, the extent of their manifestation in the workplace is likely to vary depending on the workplace sociopolitical context. Indeed, a significant body of research documents ways that individuals are affected by normative influences that they feel as a result of workplace socialization processes (Barker, 1993; Hewlin, 2003; Kunda, 1992) These socializing influences may occur through informal channels, such as water cooler conversations, after-hours gatherings, and off-site meetings (Ingram & Morris, 2007). On occasion, political ideologies may become an explicit part of the conversation during such informal socialization events; but more often, political beliefs are likely to be revealed or inferred through discussions on related topics. For example, managers or professional workers reveal their beliefs when talking about current events.

In response to these normative pressures, individuals seek to display appropriate behaviors, modeling others in comparable roles, expressing agreement with others often, and even suppressing their own views and beliefs to ostensibly embrace the beliefs expressed by peers and superiors (Hewlin, 2003; Reid, 2015). Hence in settings where there is a discrepancy between the employee's values and the values of those around them, employees are likely to adopt facades of conformity in order to display compliance with norms they perceive in their workplace (Hewlin, 2003). These pressures for conformity could also interfere with the perceptual filtering mechanisms informed by the supervisor's own political ideology. For example, a liberal supervisor -- who would normally be inclined to make decisions that rely on external attributions to decide on outcomes for workers, and give the benefit of the doubt to a female subordinate over a male subordinate – may respond to being a conservative workplace context by restraining that behavior. Conversely, when facing a liberal workplace context, that liberal supervisor may feel more empowered to make decisions favoring a female worker. To account for the potential constraining effect of these socializing influences on the political ideology effect, we propose:

> *Hypothesis 3: The supervisor liberalism effect on the gender pay gap will decrease with declining work unit liberalism. Specifically, under conditions of low work unit liberalism, the conservative-liberal difference in the gender gap will decrease, relative to conditions of high work unit liberalism.*

METHOD

Research setting

We test our ideas using unique longitudinal data from a large, full-service law firm. We obtained access to study this firm for a period of several years, during which time one of the study authors collected a range of internal records, and was granted access to interview attorneys and other staff. We used a subset of those data in the present study. Before turning to describe the data, we first provide an overview of the firm, its workers and supervisors, and its work, evaluation and pay systems.

Law firm. During our study period, the firm employed over 1,000 attorneys in several U.S. offices. The firm was organized into departments, based on different types of legal expertise. Across all departments, legal work was organized according to client projects of varying size and complexity. Often client projects involved collaboration among attorneys, within and across departments and offices.

Workers. The great majority of the firm's attorneys started working in the firm as first-year associates coming directly out of law school. Hiring into this firm was very competitive, and all potential recruits were explicitly screened based on their performance in law school and as undergraduates. Each year, a new cohort of first-year associates entered the firm, and associates were tracked according to their cohort year. Attrition occurred regularly, such that during each year some associates from each cohort year left the firm. Those associates who remained in the firm for a set number of years (withheld to preserve the firm's anonymity) were either promoted to partner or required to leave. (In very rare circumstances, a few were transitioned to a special attorney position outside of the normal career path). We refer to the associates as "workers" in our study.

Supervisors. When partners assigned associates to their client projects, they supervised them, provided on-the-job training to them, and evaluated their work. Partners "owned" specific clients, and had discretion over which associates they chose to staff on projects for their clients, from the pool of available associates in each of the firm's offices. Partners were ultimately responsible for ensuring that clients received quality legal advice and service. We refer to the partners as "supervisors" in our study.

Work system. Supervisors sought to staff their client projects with capable and skilled workers. Conversely, workers sought to be placed on client projects where they could learn from supervisors, gain work experience and exposure to clients, and (perhaps most important) log billable hours. Because the firm's entire revenue structure was based on these billable hours charged to clients, an individual worker's total annual billable hours was used as the primary proxy indicator for gauging that worker's performance. In this market-like system, workers were not guaranteed access to client projects or billable hours. As they gained experience and seniority in the firm, their skills increased, and they were assigned more complex work.

Evaluation and pay. Each year, base salary was constant for all workers from the same cohort (i.e. all those who started working in the firm in the same year). Base salaries increased in lock-step by year of seniority. Year-end performance-based bonuses were assigned on top of base pay. The exact dollar amount of bonuses depended in part on the bonus pool available each year. Hence workers paid close attention to the *relative* amount of their bonus compared with others in their cohort. Bonuses were based on annual subjective evaluations provided by those supervisors who had worked the most with each worker.

Data

For this study, we used data on all standard workers. We defined standard workers as those workers who had been hired by the firm as first-year associates. We thus excluded "lateral" hires, who had previously worked at other law firms, because they might have been subject to different pay arrangements reflecting idiosyncratic deals they negotiated during their non-standard hiring process.

We first structured our data on standard workers into worker-year units. All our time-varying variables are based on yearly time units, covering a 6-year period (2002 to 2007, inclusive). In order to ensure comparability of worker-year units, we excluded two types of non-standard working arrangements. First, we excluded worker-year observations during which workers were entering or exiting the firm, since evaluation and pay for workers in those circumstances would have been based on the completion of less than a full year's work, making them non-comparable to standard workers. Second, we also excluded worker-years involving reduced-hours program participation or extended personal leave, since evaluation and pay in those circumstances was also based on a shorter period of work, reducing comparability. The firm's reduced-hours policy asked supervisors to treat program participants equally, but previous research suggests that participants are nonetheless penalized (e.g. Glass 2004; Dau-Schmidt, et al., 2009). We excluded these worker-years to ensure that our results were not contaminated by differences in the way supervisors treated standard workers and non-standard workers.

We next matched these worker-year units with supervisors, so that we could study the effects of supervisors on worker outcomes. To capture supervisor-worker relationships, we used the firm's client project billings data. For each year, we included supervisor relationships in which a given worker had recorded at least 500 billable hours to a given supervisor's client projects. We used 500 hours as a cut-off because our interviews suggested that this was level at which department heads were guaranteed to incorporate the supervisor's evaluation into the subordinate's final performance-based pay determination. In order for a subordinate to have billed 500 hours to a supervisor's clients, the subordinate must have worked the equivalent of 3 months or more on projects for that supervisor's clients. In additional analyses described below, we experimented with other cut-off levels to explore the sensitivity of our findings.

The resulting cross-nested dataset used for our analyses encompasses 908 observations on 359 distinct workers tied to 119 distinct supervisors over 6 years. On average, using our definition of 500 billable hours as a cut-off, workers had ties to 1.42 different supervisors each year (minimum 1, maximum 3). Across the full 6-year period, each worker had ties with an average of 2.67 supervisors. Conversely, examining the dataset from the point of view of supervisors, each supervisor had ties to an average of 7.64 different workers each year, and over the full 6-year period supervisors had ties to an average of 20.29 different workers.

Variables

Dependent variable: Performance-based pay. The variable we used for the worker's performance-based pay is the total bonus awarded to each worker in a given year, net of the average bonus given to that worker's cohort that year. Following Briscoe and Kellogg (2011), this variable reflects the amount the worker received above (or below) the amount awarded to his or her corresponding peers. Our interviews indicated that this cohort-based variable approximates the way workers viewed their bonuses. Values are expressed in thousands of U.S. dollars, and they range from a minimum of -52.5 to a maximum 112.0.

Key independent variable: Supervisor liberalism. Our measure of supervisor ideology is based on the personal contributions that supervisors made to U.S. political campaigns. Because adult political ideologies tend to show high temporal stability, we used contributions data for an extended 15-year period (1990 to 2014). For this period, using publicly available data from the Center for Responsive Politics, we obtained 1243 donation records that we could definitively match by individual name and employer name to supervisors at the research site. These records allowed us to calculate liberalism scores for 78% of supervisors (exact number suppressed to preserve research site anonymity), with an average of 7.82 donations per supervisor. Among those supervisors with ties to workers in our sample during our study period, we were able to calculate liberalism scores for 73% of supervisors (87 of 119 supervisors).

We followed Chin, Hambrick and Trevino (2013) and a growing number of other studies in constructing liberalism scores using an index of four indicators, reflecting an individual's behavioral commitment, financial commitment, persistence of commitment, and scope of commitment to a particular political orientation. Behavioral commitment is measured using the number of donations the supervisor made to Democrats, divided by the total number of donations that supervisor made to both Democrats and Republicans (over the full 15-year time period). Financial commitment is measured using the dollar amount of the supervisor's donations to Democrats, divided by his or her total dollar donations over the full time period. Persistence of commitment is measured using the number of years the supervisor donated to Democrats, divided by the total number of years in which that supervisor donated to either party. Finally, scope of commitment is measured using the number of unique Democratic candidate recipients of the supervisor's donations, divided by total unique recipients of that supervisor's donations over the full time period. For each of these four indicators, a 0 value indicates complete conservatism, while a 1 value indicates complete liberalism. By using a simple average of four indicators, the final index reduces the risk of assigning ideology scores based on incidental or token donation behaviors. *Supervisor liberalism* scores range from 0 (entirely conservative) to 1 (entirely liberal). Chin and colleagues (2013) provide evidence of the validity of these liberalism scores as a reflection of personal political beliefs based on a survey of senior executives.

For the 32 of 119 supervisors who lack donation data, we used simple mean imputation to assign supervisor ideology values, thereby essentially treating them as neutral in their ideological leanings. In robustness checks reported below, we also verified that our findings are robust to the exclusion of observations associated with these individual supervisors.

Other independent variables and controls. Our analysis includes independent variables and controls that reflect attributes of both workers and supervisors. At the worker level, our independent variables include a dummy for *female*. To test Hypothesis 2, we also include a continuous variable for the worker's *seniority,* which increases each year in lock step for all associates who entered the firm together, reflecting their rise from junior associate to mid-level to senior associate.

A key control variable at the worker level is his/her total *billable hours* each year, representing a proxy indicator of worker performance in this setting (units in thousands of hours). Many law firm partners use an associate's billable hours as a crude proxy for performance, believing it indicates the extent to which *other* supervisors have deemed the worker's output to be favorable, on the assumption they would not have continued staffing the worker on their client projects otherwise. Growing numbers of scholars and practitioners recognize this is problematic (e.g. Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor 1996). Following the logic of our arguments above, liberals and conservatives might also interpret a worker's total billable hours differently, given its role in the incumbent evaluation system. Hence we include this control variable in our models.

Additional control variables at the worker level include a dummy variable for *nonwhite* workers, and another dummy for becoming a *parent*. The parent variable is based on the firm's family leave records, and is therefore accurate for female workers, but incomplete for some male workers who did not take leave at the time of their first child's birth. We also include three variables capturing the worker's human capital background prior to entering the firm, based on criteria the firm used in its hiring process: a continuous variable for the prestige *ranking of the law school* from which the worker graduated; a dummy for whether the worker *clerked* in a federal court; and the worker's *undergraduate grades* (coded in 3 categories by the firm's hiring partner). In all models, we also added a control for the *standard deviation of performance-based pay* awarded to workers of the same seniority in each calendar year, to account for the effects of an increase in the absolute size of bonuses at higher seniority levels.

At the supervisor level, in addition to the main political ideology variable, we operationalized the supervisor's work unit liberalism using two variables. First, we calculated *department liberalism* as the average liberalism score for all the other supervisors (i.e. partners) located within the focal supervisor's department in the firm, excluding the focal partner. The second variable is *department head liberalism*, which is the liberalism score for the current head of the department in which the supervisor is based. Department heads are particularly salient in our context because, as described above, they receive the subjective evaluations provided by supervisors and use them to assign bonuses. At the supervisor level, we also include controls for the supervisor's *year of birth*, and dummies for *female* or *nonwhite* supervisors.

Analyses

To model the effects of supervisor political ideology on worker performance-based pay, we use mixed-effects regression models, also knows as multi-level or hierarchical linear models.

This approach allows us to account for observable and unobservable characteristics influencing performance-based pay that originate at either the worker level or the supervisor level. In particular, we employed the *mixed* command available in Stata 14, using random intercepts for worker id's and supervisor id's. All models also include dummy variables for 6 of 7 departments, 3 of 4 office locations (not shown in tables to save space), and 5 of 6 calendar years.

RESULTS

Table 1(a) provides means and standard deviations for the variables used in our regression analysis. In Table 1(a), Column 1 provides information for the full sample, Columns 2a and 2b provide information for male and female workers, respectively, and Columns 3a and 3b provide information for workers tied to liberal and conservative supervisors.

These descriptive statistics provide initial evidence related to the gap in performance-based pay between male and female workers in our research setting. Columns 2a and 2b of Table 1 indicate that performance-based bonuses averaged 5.85 for male workers and 1.76 for female workers (t-test $p<.001$).[2] For ease of exposition, throughout this results section, we refer to the male-female difference in worker performance-based pay as a gender earnings gap.

Columns 3a and 3b of Table 1 provide information on workers tied to supervisors who were clearly conservative (liberalism values of <.3) and clearly liberal (liberalism values >.7). Comparing the two groups, performance-based pay appears higher for workers tied to conservative supervisors versus workers tied with liberal supervisors (5.78 vs. 2.82, t-test p<01)

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[2]Note that the average performance-based pay outcome across the entire sample of observations is 4.40 (i.e. $4,400). Recall that performance-based pay is normalized by each cohort average each year, such that within a given cohort-year, this outcome should average near 0. However, one reason the grand mean value is above zero is that workers with more supervisor ties tend to have higher performance-based pay, and those workers are naturally over-represented in the worker-supervisor-year dataset.

– although, as shown below, this overall effect does not carry through for female workers, as it masks a larger gender gap.

Table 1(b) provides correlations among these variables. To check for multicollinearity among the variables used in our regression, we also calculated Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores. For Model 3 in Table 2, the mean VIF score is 1.24, and the highest is 2.22, well below the recommended cutoff of 10 (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2002). We also ran additional VIF scores for models that incorporated further interactions; in these models, the highest mean VIF score is 2.95, and the highest individual coefficient VIF score is 8.55.

Turning to our regression analyses, Table 2 provides the results of mixed effects regressions predicting subordinate worker performance-based pay. The gender earnings gap is visible in Model 1, which provides a baseline model controlling for key worker and supervisor characteristics. The female worker coefficient indicates that female workers have lower performance-based bonuses (coeff. = -1.89, $p<.05$). Model 1 also includes a control for the worker's parental status, which is marginally significant and negative. Model 2 adds a key control for worker performance in this setting, based on the worker's total billable hours. This control is highly significant ($p<.001$), and reduces the magnitude and significance of the gender earnings gap as captured in the female worker coefficient. However, as we show below, the gap remains large and significant for workers tied to conservative supervisors.

Hypothesis 1 predicts that the gender earnings gap will decline for workers tied to liberal supervisors. Model 3 in Table 2 provide evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis. The coefficient for the interaction of female worker and liberal supervisor is positive and significant (coeff = 5.00, $p<.05$, Wald chi-squared value for incremental variance from the interaction term is 4.41 ($p<.05$). This result is further illustrated graphically in Figure 1, which indicates that the gender earnings gap is most pronounced at low levels of supervisor liberalism (i.e. for conservative supervisors), and it declines to the point where it disappears at high levels of supervisor liberalism. A simple slopes test indicates a significant difference for conservative supervisors ($p<.05$) and no significant difference for liberal supervisors.

Our second hypothesis predicts that the ideological effect on the gender earnings gap will decline at higher levels of seniority. Hence the next set of models in Table 2(b) (Models 4-7) explore how the relationship between supervisor liberalism and the gender earnings gap vary according to worker seniority. Across all models, one can readily see that seniority is an important control, reflecting the fact that the average bonus size increases with seniority. Model 4 provides baseline evidence that this effect of seniority also varies for male and female workers. Specifically, the negative and significant coefficient indicates that performance-based pay increases by seniority less for female workers versus male workers (coeff = -1.50, $p<.001$). This effect is shown in Figure 2, indicating that at the lowest levels of seniority (i.e. for new hires), there is little or no gender difference in performance-based pay, but that a deficit for female workers grows steadily as seniority increases.

Models 5 and 6 provide results for Hypothesis 2, based on the interaction of supervisor liberalism, female worker, and worker seniority. Models 6 also includes further controls for the interactions between the standard deviation of pay at seniority level, and worker gender and seniority, in order to fully account for any mechanical correlations between seniority, pay level, and performance-based pay. The results for both models 5 and 6 are similar, and we report the results for Model 6 which provides the most conservative test. The triple interaction coefficient is positive and significant ($p<.001$), and the Wald chi-squared value for incremental variance from the triple interaction term is 7.83 ($p<.01$). Hence, Hypothesis 2 is supported.

Figure 3 shows the magnitude of the gender earnings gap for workers of low seniority (-1 standard deviation below mean seniority) and high seniority (+1 s.d. above mean seniority). At low seniority, the gap for workers with conservative supervisors is $2,060 (and not significant using a simple slopes test), while at high seniority, the gap for workers with conservative supervisors is $15,468 ($p<.001$ using a simple slopes test).

Hypothesis 3 predicts that lower levels of work unit liberalism (i.e. greater work unit conservatism) will reduce the supervisor liberalism effect on the gender pay gap. Accordingly, Models 7 and 8 provide the results of analyses interacting supervisor liberalism with the liberalism of the supervisor's department peers and department head. Model 7 includes the interaction of female worker with department liberalism, and Model 8 includes the interaction of female work and department head liberalism. In both models, the interaction terms are not significant, and neither are simple slope tests, indicating a lack of support for Hypothesis 3.

Robustness Checks. We conducted a number of robustness checks to explore the limits of these findings. First, we considered the possibility that unobserved *worker* characteristics could still be influencing the gender earnings gap in this setting, and also influencing supervisor evaluations and reward decisions. For example, if supervisors had access to subjective information that indicated female workers had lower levels of effort or ability, net of the primary performance indicator of billable hours, they could be using this information in forming evaluations that contribute to the gender earnings gap. Although this would not explain why conservative supervisors observe or respond to this information more than liberal supervisors, it does have bearing on the size of the performance-adjusted gender earnings gap itself.

The influence of unobserved worker characteristics in our main models should already be reduced through our inclusion of a random intercept for each worker in our mixed model regressions. However, in additional robustness checks, we also implemented individual worker fixed-effects regressions. These models make use of within-worker variance in the effect of supervisor ideology to test whether that effect varies between male and female workers. These models yield substantially similar findings in terms of both the supervisor liberalism effect and its increase with worker seniority.

Second, to rule out unobserved *supervisor* characteristics, we also ran additional models using individual fixed effects at the supervisor level. These models reveal the within-supervisor effect on the relative pay gap for female workers relative to male workers – and the interaction term shows how that gap varies (between supervisors) according to level of supervisor liberalism. Using these models, our main results also remain intact. As our most rigorous robustness check accounting for unobserved individual characteristics, we also replicated our models using cross-nested fixed effect regressions at the worker and supervisor, and also year dummies. These models absorb all non-time-varying variance that occurs at each of those three levels. After including one control variable, worker billable hours, this model indicates that the interaction of supervisor ideology and female worker is positive and marginally significant ($p<.10$).

Third, we also considered whether worker-supervisor gender homophily affected performance-based pay in this setting, and whether this related in any way to the supervisor ideology effect we identified. Entering a dummy variable for the male supervisor-male worker condition into models with no control for worker or supervisor gender results in a marginally significant ($p<.10$) positive effect on bonuses. However, with the inclusion of a female worker dummy, that effect loses significance. Further, no combination of dummies for different patterns of worker-supervisor gender homophily or heterophily produces significant results in our main analyses, or affects the results in our main analyses.

Fourth, we explored how our findings are sensitive to our definition of the worker-supervisor relationship. Specifically we experimented with different minimum thresholds to define a worker's supervisor relationships. In addition to 500 hours, we also tried using 100, 250 and 1000 hours. The pattern of results is broadly similar, but significance levels are lower using 250 hours, and the findings lose significance entirely using 100 hours. This is consistent with the notion that supervisors who spend more time with a worker have more input into the performance-based pay for that worker. As an additional check on the robustness of our ideology measure, we verified that our main results are robust to the exclusion of observations based on the 32 supervisors whose liberalism scores were imputed.

Finally, we also tried replicating our analyses using worker total pay, rather than performance-based pay. To do this, we ran parallel models, adding dummy variables for calendar years and cohort years to fully account for base pay levels. The results are substantively similar, but the post-estimation margins are not estimable.

Additional Analysis. We also explored the possibility that the effect of supervisor ideology on the gender earnings gap may be mediated by supervisor behaviors that affect subordinate's access (or lack of access) to valuable work opportunities controlled by the supervisor. For this purpose, we used three different indicators reflecting the extent to which the supervisor provides the subordinate with valuable opportunities for performance, visibility, and learning. To capture opportunities for performance, we used the total amount of billable hours provided to the subordinate on projects for the supervisor's clients (logged to reduce skew). To capture opportunities for visibility, we used the weighted average prominence of clients to which the subordinate was assigned by the supervisor, defining prominence using total annual billings from each client. To capture opportunities for learning, we used the extent to which the supervisor is directly involved in the projects to which he or she has assigned the subordinate, based on hours the supervisor bills to those projects.

For each of those three indicators, we tested for mediation within the mixed effects regression framework, using the same control variables, model specifications, and panel data observations used in our main models.[3] Although we found marginal evidence that supervisor ideology affects opportunities for performance ($p<.10$), the mediation analysis did not indicate that opportunities for performance provides an indirect pathway between supervisor ideology and subordinate performance-based pay (indirect effect coefficient 0.36, $p=.25$, direct effect coefficient 6.14, $p<.05$). We did not find any evidence for the mediating effect of opportunities for visibility or learning either.

We also explored the possibility that liberal and conservative supervisors use information about the worker's total billable hours differently when evaluating male and female subordinates. Separate from the billable hours that the supervisor is providing to the worker, the supervisor may also observe the worker's total billable hours and use this information in formulating an assessment of the worker's performance. Male workers do log more total billable hours than female workers, raising the possibility that ideological beliefs influence how supervisors interpret or respond to those differences. However, in additional analyses not shown, we did not find evidence the liberal supervisors reward workers differently based on their billable hours (using an interaction of supervisor liberalism and worker total billable hours), or that female

[3]Specifically, we tested for mediation of the effect that *Supervisor Liberalism X Female Subordinate* has on performance-based pay outcomes. We used the *ml_mediation* routine in STATA 14, combined with the *bootstrap* wrapper.

workers are rewarded differently based on their billable hours (using an interaction of female worker and worker total billable hours), or that liberal supervisors rewarded men vs. women differently for their billable hours (using a triple interaction).

To sum up, our additional analyses suggest that supervisor ideology is influencing the gender earnings gap through a direct effect on subordinate evaluation and reward allocation, and not via related pathways involving the provision of access to valuable opportunities, or responses to information about total hours logged. However, since our measures of opportunity provision are limited in this research setting, we cannot entirely rule out that pathway; we discuss this as an area for future research below.

DISCUSSION

Despite legislative changes and policy interventions, gender inequality remains a pressing organizational challenge. With the growing use of market-based employment practices, supervisory discretion in providing opportunities for performance and allocating rewards has been recognized as an important source of gender inequality in earnings. Building on recent research showing managerial discretion is linked to bias in worker rewards, we document one systematic source of that bias: managers' personal political beliefs. In the context of professional work, where managers have great latitude in making reward allocation decisions, and the work itself is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about how performance can be evaluated and rewarded, political beliefs offer an important yet little-examined pathway to explaining the gender gap. Using longitudinal data from a large law firm, combined with political donation records, we found the gender gap in performance-based pay was greatly reduced for workers tied to liberal supervisors, relative to conservative supervisors. Further, this political ideology effect on earnings increased as workers gained seniority in the organization. Surprisingly, the supervisor ideology effect neither reduced nor increased as a function of the supervisor's workplace context, as captured by the liberalism of the supervisor's unit peers or unit leader. We also found these effects after accounting for the worker's proxied performance (i.e., billable hours). And, although liberal (conservative) supervisors provided women with marginally more (less) billable hours, that did not explain the effects of supervisor ideology on bonus allocations. Overall, these finding suggest that political ideology directly predicts the allocation of rewards and other performance opportunities, net of other decisions managers make that may separately be impacting worker performance.

The theoretical and practical implications of these findings extend beyond professional work contexts, such as the law firm we examined, to the broader domain of organizational research on gender inequality across a wide array of work contexts. Decades of organizational investments in diversity and inclusion practices appear to have had limited effect in bringing about gender parity at work (Kalev, Dobbin & Kelly, 2006). Even greater female representation in the upper echelons does not necessarily reduce the rewards gap between male and female managers (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015), and research on the effects of demographic similarity to managers on employment outcomes for men and women has been equivocal (e.g., Riordan, 2003). Findings regarding the effects of other organizational mechanisms directly related to pay practices, such as pay formalization, have yielded mixed findings as well, with some scholars indicating formalization limits biased decision-making (e.g., Elvira & Graham, 2002; Reskin, 2003), and others indicating less-formal employment routines and practices may allow managers leeway to address inequality (Dencker, 2008; Kanter, 1993). Our study suggests these mixed findings can be understood in part through the lens of supervisor political beliefs. To wit, greater leeway allows supervisors to behave in ways that reflect their personal values—and the consequences of that leeway depend on whether the supervisor's values tilt them toward acceptance or reduction of inequalities.

Theoretical Contributions

This research contributes to our understanding of the determinants of the gender earnings gap, by providing theory and evidence on the effects of supervisor political beliefs on that gap. Studies of the overall gender gap in earnings tend to focus on three perspectives: differences in human capital and labor supply; structural arguments about differences in selection into organizations and areas of specialization; and bias/discrimination (Epstein, Saute, Oglensky & Gever, 1995; Kay and Gorman, 2008; Barbulescu and Bidwell 2013). Our study occurs in a context in which the first two sources of the gender gap are essentially minimized. Workers are all at the upper end of the human capital spectrum, there are accurate controls for labor supply in the form of billable hours, workers are all based in the same organization, and areas of specialization are controlled. By ruling out these other explanations based on our choice of research setting and methodology, we are able to unpack how managerial bias informed by political ideology explains the gender gap in organizational rewards.

Our findings thus speak to the third perspective, bias/discrimination, by offering insight into the "opportunity structure" for experiencing bias, which is far from evenly distributed across the organizational landscape. In a substantive departure from past research that has viewed in-group preference and homophily mechanisms as a source of variation in this landscape, we examined how less overt managerial beliefs lead to systematic differences in the opportunity for gender bias. The opportunity structure we uncovered is not visible by looking at the formal organizational chart or codified materials, or by viewing the demographic composition of the upper echelons, but rather is a reflection of exogenous and seemingly innocuous personal values that can trickle into everyday managerial decision-making.

Our results are broadly consistent with Briscoe and Kellogg's (2011) finding that supervisor assignments are very consequential for subsequent rewards and organizational career trajectories. However, our results offer an important twist by implying that for women (and men), the consequences of supervisor assignment may hinge on the ideological background of that supervisor. In fact, values about embracing social change (versus the status quo), and beliefs about rejecting inequality (versus accepting inequality), rooted in a supervisor's personal political ideology, can even serve as a resistive force against male-typed norms of performance and success characterizing managerial and professional jobs (e.g., Eagly & Karau, 2002; Heilman et al., 2004). To be clear we do not make the claim that conservative values are misogynistic, or that liberal values are inherently feminist in their orientation. The liberalism-conservatism index offers a well-established framework to capture a wide array of underlying gender-neutral preferences about tradition, flexibility, chaos, and conformity (Jost et al., 2008; Nosek et al., 2007). But in historically male-dominated settings these seemingly gender-neutral beliefs, formed outside the purview of organizations, can filter into managerial decision-making with important implications for gender inequality at work.

Our study also contributes to research on political ideology. Social scientists have commented extensively on the growing polarization of political values and cultural preferences and how political ideology has seeped into almost every domain of life such as leisure, lifestyles and buying habits of individuals (Giddens, 1991; Bennett, 1998; DellaPosta et al., 2015). In the face of these trends, there has been surprisingly little research on how conservatism (liberalism) might shape gender bias in organizations. Recently scholars have linked political beliefs of senior executives to firm level outcomes such as investments in CSR or employee activism (Chin et al., 2013; Briscoe et al., 2014). Our study provides evidence for a more direct and proximal linkage between political beliefs and managerial decision-making throughout the organization.

Given uncertainty about how work can be evaluated and success ascertained, managers can fall back on values and beliefs that shape how they perceive and interpret information about workers (Tetlock et al., 2013). We theorized that through the mechanism of perceptual filtering, liberal and conservative supervisors rely on different heuristics when they make allocative decisions. Liberals make external attributions, giving the benefit of the doubt to female workers; conservatives make internal attributions, assuming gender differences reflect human capital or motivational differences rather than systemic barriers and biases. Our hypothesized findings are consistent with these arguments, and our additional analyses add further interesting detail. In particular, given conservatives' tendency to be more accepting of unequal performance outcomes and the systems that produce them, in additional analyses we tested whether conservatives responded more to a worker-performance proxy commonly found in our research setting (billable hours). We did not find that conservatives rewarded this performance proxy any more than liberals; instead, conservatives produced a wider gender pay gap even after accounting for it. This fits a view of manager ideology operating through a relatively implicit mechanism involving perceptual filtering and motivated cognition. Indeed, across thousands of participants in the Project Implicit Study, although all respondents showed a preference for higher status groups, implicit preferences for high status groups such as straight, white, or light skinned individuals was lower among liberals than among conservatives (Nosek et al., 2007). These differences in implicit preferences may also guide allocative decision-making leading liberals to respond more favorably to female subordinates as a way to reject male-typed norms and schema for success, and lead conservatives to respond more favorably to male subordinates as a way to maintain the status-quo in professional contexts that favor men.

Our findings also contribute to research on organizational careers. A striking pattern in our findings is that as women gain seniority in the firm, they experience significantly more of a gap in rewards from conservative managers. Indeed, the magnitude of the gender gap increases more than seven-fold as workers assigned to conservative managers gain seniority in the firm. Although this finding supports the "penalties for success" argument in the organizational psychology domain (Heilman, 2004), it differs from some past sociological research on the opportunity structure for discrimination that has focused on the increasing availability of unambiguous performance information as worker tenure increases (e.g., Petersen & Saporta, 2004). To understand how the supervisor ideology effect changes with seniority, we theorized that as workers gain seniority, they tend to take on more complex tasks, requiring more subjectivity in their evaluation, and reducing the relevance of information from their past performance on different tasks. These findings thus shed light on how women accrue or are able to overcome career mobility disadvantages in professional and managerial contexts.

We surmise that the increasing disadvantages that women face as they climb the ranks of professional law firms may reflect the conservative leanings of key decision-makers rather than in-group preferences. In the context of law firms, Gorman and Kmec (2009) found that firms tended to hire women externally into partner ranks rather than internally, because women partnered elsewhere had a proven track record that minimizes bias against them. However, our findings suggest that the tendency to hire externally may also be constrained by the political values of decision-makers. Since the reward allocation decisions of conservative supervisors appear to persist in the face of performance-related information, it seems unlikely that firms with conservative partners will make up for internal shortfall in qualified women by hiring externally at partner levels.

Generalizability and Future Research Directions

Our results from a single firm will need to be replicated in other settings in order to learn how they generalize. However, our theory and findings should apply to many settings involving professional and managerial workers, where supervisors tend to lack objective performance indicators, and must therefore rely more on subjective discretion in formulating evaluations and allocating rewards. In contrast, we would expect that the impact of supervisor political values to be diminished in settings involving routine work that can be largely captured through objective performance indicators.

We also anticipate that our theorizing about supervisor ideology should generalize beyond gender to apply to workers who are members of other historically disadvantaged groups in society, such as racial minorities, LGBT workers, immigrants, and religious minorities. The theory is based on a general tendency for liberal supervisors to reflect their greater acceptance of social change and their rejection of inequality in decisions related to subordinate evaluation and rewards. Those tendencies may also find expression with regard to other ascriptive characteristics of workers that are visible to supervisors and which trigger similar processes.

Our analyses account for many observable differences between male and female workers. Although female workers logged fewer billable hours, reflecting lower values on this proxy indicator for performance, this did not explain the supervisor ideology effect on the gender earnings gap. On the contrary, as we reported in the addition analyses section above, the supervisor ideology effect on bonuses persists after controlling for differences in how high- and low-billing men and women are distributed across liberal and conservative supervisors.

Could other, unmeasured, differences in how male and female workers are distributed between liberal and conservative supervisors threaten our findings? Our strategic research setting and modeling strategy should limit the scope of this threat. In particular, the supervisor ideology effects arise in the presence of worker random effects in our main models, and in the presence of worker fixed effects in our robustness checks. This increases confidence in our findings against an alternative explanation based on worker unobserved characteristics. That said, one fascinating area for future research would be to consider how male and female subordinates perceive supervisor ideological leanings and respond to them through their own career behaviors.

From the perspective of workers' organizational choices, future research may also examine whether worker mobility in highly skilled professional contexts is a reflection of extent to which employees are aware of the distribution of political ideologies among managers in their organizations. Chin and Hambrick (2014) found that LGBT employee groups were more likely to form in firms presided over by liberal CEOs, indicating a degree of awareness concerning the personal political ideologies of organizational leaders among at least those employees who are motivated by concern over the potential implications for their own personal agendas and fates. This awareness may explain variability in attrition rates among senior women and movements towards firms that are viewed as liberal and more likely to implement equitable allocation practices at senior levels. Liberally oriented firms may also be likely to attract and retain experienced female workers to a greater extent.

Future research should also further explore the links between female workers and parenting. As noted above, the parenting variable we used misses at least some male parenting events in which male workers did not take any leave. In addition, in our research setting, many female workers quit the firm or make use of flexible-work benefits soon after becoming parents, and all those female worker observations are excluded from our analysis, effectively censoring the set of female parent observations in the analyses. That said, in analyses not shown, we also explored whether supervisors' political beliefs affected the way workers were rewarded after becoming parents (Budig and Hodges 2010; Benard and Correll 2010). Using a time-varying parent variable, we found that supervisor ideology did not affect bonuses awarded to parents versus non-parents, nor did ideology affect the differential rewards to female vs. male parents.

Finally, we note that although we used a previously validated and unobtrusive measure of political ideology, other more subjective measures that correlate with individual differences in values about inequality and social change (e.g., social dominance orientation) may also influence supervisor bias in reward allocation to men and women. While our study does not minimize the importance of these dispositional attributes, we believe that our measure obviates the tendency towards social desirability that might hamper the reliability of subjective measures in field settings while tapping into a broader construct that represents beliefs that are shaped extra-organizationally and yet can have important implications for gender bias within organizations. Recently, scholars in the area of work team diversity have theorized about the effects of teams' 'diversity mindsets' on shaping the performance implications in diverse teams (Van Knippenberg, Van Ginkel & Homan, 2013) calling for greater attention to cognitive processes as explanations for performance challenges associated with diversity. Others have pointed to beliefs and dispositions about how individuals respond to dissimilar coworkers (Chattopadhyay, 2013; Chattopadhyay, George, Ng, 2016). These beliefs, dispositions, and cognitive states may also be worth examining as explanations for supervisory gender bias in future research.

Policy and Practical Implications

While our study does not speak directly to the policy implications of the supervisor ideology effect, it nonetheless behooves us to consider what types of policies may be useful in light of the effects of supervisor ideology in furthering or hindering diversity goals in organization and in society. Of course, it would be misguided to suggest that organizations hire and promote only liberal managers. Nor does it appear that increasing the numerical representation of female supervisors would reduce the supervisor ideological effect, based on our analysis indicating that the ideology effect exists regardless of supervisor gender or supervisor-worker gender homophily. Gender inequality is a particularly stubborn problem in settings such as corporate law firms, where nearly half of incoming associates are women, yet women represent less than twenty percent of partners (NALP, 2005). In 2006, the National Association of Women Lawyers sought to double the amount of female equity partners in the AmLaw 200 by 2014. At that time, only 15% of equity partners were female. However, in 2014, the goal failed, reaching only 16.8% (NALP, 2015). Similar trends have been noted in many other managerial and professional contexts as well. In settings like this, what other policy or practical options might be indicated by our study?

An obvious starting point would be to focus on organizational policies that allow proximal peers to observe a supervisor's evaluation and reward decisions; if a manager knows peers are watching, he or she should be more constrained in expressing bias tendencies (Castilla, 2016). Yet we did not find evidence that conservative bias effects were dampened by working in a department with more-liberal peers or leaders overseeing reward decisions. This underscores the individual autonomy that supervisors enjoy in professional workplaces such as law firms, serving to decrease their sensitivity to proximal workplace socializing influences. Since supervisors enjoy autonomy and discretion in many professional and managerial settings, such insensitivity to proximal workplace influences may be common. Therefore, *other* rewards and sanctions may be needed to incentivize the closing of the gender gap. We offer two suggestions:

First, for organizations that identify achieving gender equality as an over-arching goal, one feasible internal policy might be to identify those supervisors who show the lowest gender gap in subordinate worker evaluations – and reward them for this behavioral outcome. Based on our findings, such a policy may reward individual supervisors whose behavior correlates with liberal beliefs, but the policy's design and intent are simply based on behaviors aimed at eliminating inequality. In determining the gender gap at the supervisor level, it would be important for this policy to account for any *objective* worker performance indicators. Variations on this policy might also seek to reward supervisors who allocate resources, projects, and on-the-job learning opportunities among male and female workers in an equitable manner. The recent diffusion of "workplace analytics" software tracking workflow and performance details should make such policies easier to implement with little additional cost.

Second, in identifying a source of gender inequality lying outside organizations, our research suggests that solutions may also lie outside organizations. For example, since clients are a major source of revenue for professional firms, client advocacy for gender equality is an important way to incentivize gender integration within professional service firms (e.g. Beckman and Phillips 2005). Regulatory agencies and professional associations are similarly seeking to ensure that firms increase accountability and transparency practices related to gender equality. Professional associations in the high technology industry (e.g., National Council for Women in I.T.), for instance, have successfully pressured high tech firms to adopt more transparent performance management and rewards systems and may offer exemplars in this regard. Our findings suggest it could be fruitful for these types of efforts to specifically encourage firms to track the gender gap in worker outcomes at the supervisor level; for example, professional service firm clients advocating gender equality could require evidence that supervisors working on their most valuable projects are staffing them with equal numbers of female workers, and that worker pay outcomes are equitable for supervisors involved in their projects.

Finally, our findings also can be related to a recent trend toward outsourcing and automating routine work (Bidwell, et al., 2013). This trend may hold unintended consequences for achieving gender equality, if firms hive off routine work that can be objectively evaluated, and keep only the most complex work that requires subjective evaluation and which is therefore more subject to biases originating in supervisor personal beliefs. It will be important for researchers and policymakers alike to understand how outsourcing and automation activities affect the supervisor biases that have been documented in this study and elsewhere.

Conclusion

In sum, our findings show that the growing managerial discretion in reward allocation warrants greater attention to factors other than demographic attributes that shape managers' gendered beliefs. In the context or professional work, where the scope for organizational mechanisms to restrain the potential for bias is weak, and the opportunity structure for reliance on extra-organizational influences on decision-making is strong, we undertook an in-depth longitudinal analysis that highlighted the influence of political beliefs on the gender gap in earnings. We hope that future research will continue to unpack the mechanisms by which managers political beliefs can shape reward allocation and evaluative decision making across a variety of organizational settings.

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FIGURE 1
Predicted Effects of Supervisor Ideology
on Male vs. Female Worker Performance-based Pay



FIGURE 2
Predicted Performance Pay for Male and Female Workers, by Seniority

FIGURE 3
Predicted Effects of Supervisor Ideology
on Male vs. Female Worker Performance-based Pay,
by Seniority



TABLE 1(a)
Descriptive Statistics

	(1) All	(2a) Male workers	(2b) Female workers	(3a) Conservative supervisors[1]	(3b) Liberal supervisors[1]
Worker: # of supervisor relationships per year	1.42	1.44	1.40	1.58	1.37
	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.60)	(0.55)
Worker: # of supervisor relationships across all years	2.67	2.81	2.43	2.92	2.46
	(1.39)	(1.46)	(1.23)	(1.52)	(1.37)
Worker: Performance-based pay	4.40	5.85	1.76	5.78	2.82
	(12.08)	(13.87)	(7.17)	(13.82)	(9.40)
Worker: Standard deviation of pay at seniority level	51.33	51.93	50.25	51.80	50.75
	(7.32)	(7.73)	(6.39)	(8.05)	(6.56)
Worker: Female	0.36	n/a	n/a	0.38	0.37
	(0.48)			(0.49)	(0.48)
Worker: Parent	0.11	0.12	0.09	0.12	0.09
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Worker: Seniority	3.09	3.37	2.59	3.41	2.84
	(2.08)	(2.18)	(1.78)	(2.30)	(1.89)
Worker: Billable hours (thousands)	1.90	1.94	1.83	2.01	1.87
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.34)
Worker: Nonwhite	0.10	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.10
	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.30)
Worker: Law School Rank	16.76	16.94	16.42	16.38	17.07
	(4.66)	(4.55)	(4.84)	(5.01)	(4.46)
Worker: Clerked	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.22
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.42)
Worker: Undergraduate grades	1.25	1.17	1.38	1.25	1.30
	(0.72)	(0.77)	(0.61)	(0.76)	(0.68)
Supervisor: Year of birth	1956.46	1956.96	1955.56	1953.34	1956.27
	(5.72)	(5.65)	(5.73)	(5.02)	(5.76)
Supervisor: Female	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.04	0.18
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.19)	(0.39)
Supervisor: Nonwhite	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.00)	(0.08)
Supervisor: Liberalism	0.60	0.61	0.60	0.11	0.95
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Supervisor: Department liberalism	0.68	0.68	0.70	0.68	0.71
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Supervisor: Department head's liberalism	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.96
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)
Observations	908	585	323	134	330

Note: Mean values shown (standard deviations in parentheses)
[1]Defined as conservative < .3 and liberal > .7 on liberalism index.

TABLE 1(b)
Correlations

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1	Worker: Performance-based pay															
2	Worker: Standard deviation of pay at seniority level	.34														
3	Worker: Female	-.16	-.11													
4	Worker: Parent	0	.14	-.05												
5	Worker: Seniority	.42	.69	-.18	.16											
6	Worker: Billable hours (thousands)	.47	.2	-.15	-.02	.36										
7	Worker: Nonwhite	-.09	-.07	.09	-.03	-.14	-.17									
8	Worker: Law School Rank	.11	.08	-.05	.06	.08	.03	.04								
9	Worker: Clerked	0	-.02	-.02	.05	-.04	.03	-.07	.14							
10	Worker: Undergraduate grades	.01	-.02	.13	-.06	-.07	.04	.01	.1	.11						
11	Supervisor: Year of birth	0	.02	-.12	.02	.04	.01	-.02	-.05	-.01	.03					
12	Supervisor: Female	-.06	-.03	.08	0	-.02	-.07	.03	.02	.02	-.02	.14				
13	Supervisor: Nonwhite	-.01	.01	0	-.01	0	-.01	.03	-.01	.03	0	.03	.16			
14	Supervisor: Liberalism	-.1	-.05	-.01	-.03	-.1	-.12	.02	.05	.07	.03	.11	.19	0		
15	Supervisor: Department liberalism	-.09	-.07	.1	-.04	-.12	-.12	-.05	.05	.31	.12	-.18	0	-.01	.19	
16	Supervisor: Department head’s liberalism	0	.07	.01	.07	.15	.05	-.06	.02	-.01	-.1	.03	-.01	0	-.13	-.06

N=906; Correlations greater than or equal to |.07| are significant at .05 level.

TABLE 2(a)
Results of Mixed Effects Models Predicting Worker Performance Pay

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Worker: Seniority	1.93***	1.35***	1.34***
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Worker: Parent	-2.30+	-1.34	-1.31
	(1.28)	(1.20)	(1.20)
Worker: Nonwhite	-1.85	-0.48	-0.28
	(1.37)	(1.28)	(1.28)
Worker: Law School Rank	0.18+	0.17+	0.17+
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Worker: Clerked	1.66	0.94	0.92
	(1.22)	(1.12)	(1.12)
Worker: Undergraduate grades	0.22	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.64)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Worker: Standard deviation of	0.06	0.10+	0.11+
pay at seniority level	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Worker: Billable hours		10.31***	10.24***
		(1.10)	(1.09)
Supervisor: Year of birth	-0.07	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Supervisor: Female	-0.05	0.06	0.14
	(1.26)	(1.21)	(1.20)
Supervisor: Nonwhite	-0.28	-0.38	-0.29
	(3.16)	(3.01)	(3.00)
Supervisor: Liberalism	-0.85	-1.25	-2.84
	(1.73)	(1.64)	(1.80)
Supervisor: Department	30.63	5.58	19.09
liberalism	(59.10)	(56.34)	(56.51)
Supervisor: Department head	-12.30+	-12.93+	-13.29*
liberalism	(7.24)	(6.66)	(6.64)
Worker: Female	-1.89*	-1.12	-4.18*
	(0.96)	(0.88)	(1.70)
W: Female X			5.00*
S: Liberalism			(2.38)
Constant	122.93	-616.74	-578.34
	(138.57)	(444.72)	(443.72)
N	906	906	906
Log Likelihood	-3368.72	-3329.04	-3326.84

Note: Location, departments and calendar year dummies included
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 2(b)
Results of Mixed Effects Models Predicting Worker Performance Pay (cont'd)

	(4)	(5)	(6)†	(7)†	(8)
Worker: Seniority	1.82***	3.31***	3.41***	1.28***	1.33***
	(0.27)	(0.47)	(0.63)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Worker: Parent	-1.32	-1.16	-1.21	-1.47	-1.33
	(1.20)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.20)	(1.20)
Worker: Nonwhite	-0.16	0.11	0.07	-0.24	-0.24
	(1.27)	(1.25)	(1.25)	(1.28)	(1.28)
Worker: Law School Rank	0.17+	0.16+	0.16+	0.16+	0.17+
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Worker: Clerked	1.01	1.32	1.28	0.98	0.89
	(1.11)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.12)	(1.12)
Worker: Undergraduate grades	-0.12	-0.08	-0.08	0.00	-0.08
	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Worker: Standard deviation of	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.12*	0.11+
pay at seniority level	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Worker: Billable hours	10.18***	10.03***	10.00***	10.24***	10.21***
	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.10)	(1.09)
Supervisor: Year of birth	-0.05	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Supervisor: Female	-0.08	0.24	0.24	0.12	0.16
	(1.20)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(1.20)	(1.20)
Supervisor: Nonwhite	-0.30	0.17	0.25	-0.20	-0.30
	(3.00)	(2.96)	(2.96)	(3.01)	(3.00)
Supervisor: Liberalism	-1.24	-1.41	-8.04	-4.93	-3.18
	(1.64)	(1.81)	(13.11)	(10.42)	(29.98)
Supervisor: Department	1.87	20.26	17.50	11.86	
liberalism	(56.35)	(55.75)	(55.85)	(57.40)	
Supervisor: Department head	-10.53	-12.04+	-11.58+		-11.36
liberalism	(6.72)	(6.63)	(6.65)		(27.56)
Worker: Female	2.96*	-3.93*	1.65	-2.85	21.41
	(1.38)	(1.70)	(13.78)	(12.74)	(34.20)
W: Female X		4.52+	4.73	-1.38	-27.64
S: Liberalism		(2.42)	(21.37)	(17.67)	(41.69)
W: Female X	-1.50***	-3.95***	-3.73***		
W: Seniority	(0.40)	(0.80)	(1.02)		
S: Liberalism X		-2.51***	-2.83**		
W: Seniority		(0.63)	(0.92)		
W: Female X S: Liberalism X		4.26***	4.31**		
W: Seniority		(1.21)	(1.54)		
S: Liberalism X			0.13		
W: S.D. of pay			(0.25)		
W: Female X			-0.11		
W: S.D. of pay			(0.27)		
S: Liberalism X W: Female X			-0.00		
W: S.D. of pay			(0.42)		
S: Liberalism X				3.37	
S: Department liberalism				(15.22)	
W: Female X				-1.85	
S: Department liberalism				(18.60)	
S: Liberalism X W: Female X				8.60	
S: Department liberalism				(25.07)	

S: Liberalism X					0.04
S: Dept head liberalism					(30.61)
W: Female X					-26.23
S: Dept head liberalism					(35.00)
S: Liberalism X W: Female X					33.43
S: Dept head liberalism					(42.70)
Constant	86.39	106.68	111.14	-727.99+	-581.82
	(131.86)	(129.63)	(129.89)	(440.98)	(449.36)
N	906	906	906	906	906
Log Likelihood	-3320.70	-3309.63	-3309.02	-3328.58	-3326.17

Note: Location, departments and calendar year dummies included
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; Standard errors are in parentheses.
†Worker seniority variable is centered for interactions in these models.